Definition of a Journalist - Nicholas Lemann. Dec. 26, 2007

"Statements made in judicial proceedings are protected as are communications between a solicitor and their client. The Bill of Rights of 1689 provides that proceedings of the Parliament of the United Kingdom are also covered by absolute privilege."

My emails to David Aman were part of a Judicial Proceeding. The Law states that even before the proceeding, in connection with the Proceeding, these emails are part of a Judicial Proceeding, and whether protected or not is another matter. However, David Aman emailed me a cease and desist December 22nd 2010, this was a legal threat and I answered this email in my Pro Se Capacity.

I answered  this email in my Pro Se Capacity more then once, the second time was AFTER a 10 Million Dollar Lawsuit was filed and is the eMail that the New York Times, Seattle Weekly, Forbes and there by the world views as Extortion, which is a crime. This email was a Settlement Communication, a negotiation to STOP a 10 Million Dollar Lawsuit. There were emails back and forth between opposing counsel David Aman, Tonkon Torp Attorney and Pro Se Defendant Crystal Cox in my Pro Se Capacity. And they were all after the the threat of a lawsuit. In fact the Subject Post I was on Trial for was part of a Judicial Proceeding already as well, because David Aman emailed me a Cease and Desist, a Lawsuit Threat on December 22, 2010 and the subject post I was on trial for was posted 3 days after that on December 25th 2010.  A 10 million dollar lawsuit was filed 2 weeks later on January 14th 2011.

David Aman and Tonkon Torp are Libel for painting me in False Light in Big Media around the world. David Aman did this out of Hate and Spite, for he had already won his lawsuit. This is ILLEGAL. This is Defamation. This is False Light. And this is in conjunction with David Aman's pattern of Hate Crimes against me, Blogger Crystal Cox.

Was David Aman's communications with me protected? Was there an ethical or legal duty to display the entire email thread that clearly stated I was NOT removing anything for money? Is Tonkon Torp Law Firm liable for the massive defamation to me by David Aman painting me in false light and sending One Email out of that thread to big media and thereby inciting hate, ruining my ability to make a living and endangering my life?

If you an attorney that wants to represent me on contingency in suing Tonkon Torp Law Firm and their Insurance Carrier, as well as David S. Aman personally and Professionally, email me at Crystal@CrystalCox.com

More on this Story At

http://www.obsidianfinancesucks.com/

http://www.crystalcoxcase.com/

Qualified Privilege and Absolute Privilege APPLY to Blogger Crystal Cox. I have been a real estate broker owner for over a decade, I first wrote on the Summit Bankruptcy becase ALL real estate agents MUST know about 1031 Exchange Laws, and potential client liabilities. I have always had a justifiable motive.

"

Privilege and malice

Privilege provides a complete bar and answer to a defamation suit, though conditions may have to be met before this protection is granted. 

Privilege is any circumstance that justifies or excuses a prima facie tort. It can be said that privilege recognizes a defendant's action stemmed from an interest of social importance - and that society wants to protect such interests by not punishing those who pursue them. Privilege can be argued whenever a defendant can show that he acted from a justifiable motive. 

While some privileges have long been recognized, the court may create a new privilege for particular circumstances - privilege as an affirmative defence is a potentially ever-evolving doctrine. Such newly created or circumstantially recognized privileges are referred to as residual justification privileges.

There are two types of privilege in the common law tradition:

• "Absolute privilege" has the effect that a statement cannot be sued on as defamatory, even if it were made maliciously; a typical example is evidence given in court (although this may give rise to different claims, such as an action for malicious prosecution or perjury) or statements made in a session of the legislature (known as 'Parliamentary privilege' in Commonwealth countries).
• 
  
• "Qualified privilege" may be available to the journalist as a defence in circumstances where it is considered important that the facts be known in the public interest; an example would be public meetings, local government documents, and information relating to public bodies such as the police and fire departments. Qualified privilege has the same effect as absolute privilege, but does not protect statements that can be proven to have been made with malicious intent.
• 
  

[edit]Other defences

Defences to claims of defamation include:

• Statements made in a good faith and reasonable belief that they were true are generally treated the same as true statements; however, the court may inquire into the reasonableness of the belief. The degree of care expected will vary with the nature of the defendant: an ordinary person might safely rely on a single newspaper report, while the newspaper would be expected to carefully check multiple sources."
  

Source and More Information

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defamation

The Summit Bankruptcy was highly publicized. It was involvoing a 1031 Exchange company which is in regard to a Tax Code. Also the Summit Bankruptcy had lawsuits with major insurance companies and with Umpqua Bank. Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox certainly did have Qualified Privilege. This was and continues to be a matter of Public Concern.

I have been a real estate broker owner for over a decade, I first wrote on the Summit Bankruptcy becase ALL real estate agents MUST know about 1031 Exchange Laws, and potential client liabilities. I have always had a justifiable motive.

Blogger Crystal Cox had Absolute Privilege, this is a Matter of Law and a Matter of Fact.

Judge Marco Hernandez acted in conspiracy with Oregon Attorney David Aman in order to cover up corruption in Oregon. And to protect Judge Michael Simon and countless others involved in the Summit Bankruptcy Scandal.

All Citizens have a Right to Free Speech. ALL Citizens have a Right To the Free Speech Rights of the Constitution. Judge Marco Hernandez made Free Speech his Collateral Damage in Protecting Judge Michael Simon and the Portland Oregon Culture of Corruption.

"The Mike Wallace Interview

William O. Douglas

5/11/58

William Douglas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, talks with Wallace about freedom of expression and the freedom to exchange ideas. In Douglas's book, The Right of the People, he wrote, "In recent years, as we have denounced the loss of liberties abroad we have witnessed its decline here in America."

Source, Full Article and Video at Link Below
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/douglas_william.html

Obsidian Finance Group LLC v. Cox Ninth Circuit Appeal: ScotusBlog.com Submits Amicus Brief in Obsidian Vs. Cox Appeal Supporting No Party and In Support of the Issue At Stake for All Bloggers, Citizen Journalists and New Media Blogs.

Anti-Corruption Blogger Crystal Cox Sued for Defamation. 

Portland Oregon Federal Judge Says Bloggers are Not Journalists and BLOGS are Not Media. Blogger Denied the Protection of the First Amendment, Shield Laws, Anti-Slapp Laws and Retraction Laws. Thereby Protecting conflicts of interest and corruption among Portland Oregon's Top Law Firms, Attorney and Judges.

Obsidian Finance Group LLC v. Cox Ninth Circuit Appeal: 

ScotusBlog.com, Thomas Goldstein Files Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Brief in the Obsidian Finance Group, LLC et al., v. Crystal Cox Appeal.  Thomas C. Goldstein submits this Amicus Brief Supporting No Party and In Support of the Issue At Stake for All Bloggers, Citizen Journalists and New Media Blogs.

ScotusBlog.com, Thomas C. Goldstein Says,  "As a "blog" that provides a useful public service to several million readers each year, but is nonetheless unable to satisfy most of the criteria for "media" indentified by the district court in this case, the blog has an interest in the this case because of the prospect that it too would be unable to avail itself of the protections prrovided by the First Amendment and could face potential liability in a lawsuit for libel or defamation."

Read the Full ScotusBlog.com, Thomas C. Goldstein Amicus Brief Below

ScotusBlog.com Amicus Brief Regarding Obsidian Vs. Cox Appeal


more on the Obsidian Finance Group V. Crystal L. Cox Case

CrystalCoxCase.com

ObsidianFinanceSucks.com

Obsidian Finance Group LLC v. Cox Ninth Circuit Appeal: Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Amicus Brief.

Anti-Corruption Blogger Crystal Cox Sued for Defamation. 

Portland Oregon Federal Judge Says Bloggers are Not Journalists and BLOGS are Not Media. Blogger Denied the Protection of the First Amendment, Shield Laws, Anti-Slapp Laws and Retraction Laws. Thereby Protecting conflicts of interest and corruption among Portland Oregon's Top Law Firms, Attorney and Judges.

the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Amicus Brief

MarcRandazza.com Domain Name Dispute. Marc Randazza and the Czech Arbitration Court Domain Name Dispute. Marc Randazza thinks he is above the Law and can take whatever he WANTS. Regardless of the Law or the Constitutional Rights of others. Expose Marc Randazza, Randazza Legal Group

Marc Randazza is a self proclaimed First Amendment Attorney, and many believe Marc Randazza is an advocate of Free Speech. Marc Randazza has very good connections regarding who to pay, and how to play within the First Amendment Bar and the Free Speech Laws, but Marc Randazza is no Champion of the First Amendment.

Marc Randazza has done all he can to turn on the Free Speech Rights of a woman whom he wanted to represent in a major Free Speech Case and whom turned him down because he treated her badly.

I am that woman and since this time, nearly a year ago now, Marc Randazza has stolen domain names, filed protective orders, got entire blogs at wordpress and blogger deleted with no warning and has used his power and connections to attack my Free Speech Rights, and stomp on the First Amendment Rights of All.

Marc Randazza has threatened me, conspired to set me up with criminal charges, painted me in False Light, lied about me to Forbes, defamed me, incited a lynch mob against me, and all because Marc Randazza did not approve of a Domain Name I purchased and I rejected Marc J. Randazza of Randazza Legal Group as my Attorney.

I want to sue Marc Randazza for painting me in false light, for defamation, for lying to major media and therefore causing harm to my income potential, endangering my life, causing me duress and more. If you an attorney who is NOT afraid of Marc Randazza, please email me Crystal L. Cox to represent me in a suing Marc Randazza, Randazza Legal Group.

Marc Randazza, appears to me to have mafia ties and is VERY Dangerous.  

Marc Randazza is knowledgeable in First Amendment Laws and has many connections, affiliations and conflicts of interest.  Marc Randazza uses this knowledge in order to get his clients and potential clients to bend to his will.

Marc Randazza is a very dangerous man and is connected to stalkers in the Porn Industry whom threaten Porn Stars.  Marc Randazza threatened one of my sources in a private forum, she therefore stopped speaking about Marc Randazza.  Marc Randazza told where she lived, what she drove and wished death upon her.

Marc Randazza is not a good man and must be Exposed. Email me at SavvyBroker@Yahoo.com to Expose Marc Randazza and to Parody Marc Randazza.

Two New Blogs will Expose Marc Randazza

ExposeMarcRandazza.com  and MarcRandazzaParody.com

Below is a Letter eMailed to me Regarding my Rights to Own MarcRandazza.com - Marc Randazza, King of Free Speech Suppression, steals Domain Names and Intellectual Property that Marc Randazza was to dumb to buy or to build. And Marc Randazza will relentless attack you if you demand your First Amendment Rights.


""Dear Crystal,

You and I share a common enemy. I hate that copyright troll shit Marc Randazza. I saw that he filed a domain name dispute against you in the CAC. I am pretty sure that the connection he has with the Czech Republic is that his wife is Czech. Since he obviously has some sort of criminal ties, I wouldn't be shocked if it was that far-reaching.

At any rate, I've dealt with these kinds of things before, and I thought I would offer you a bit of help since I know first-hand how expensive these things can get. I got a copy of his complaint, and I did a lot of research for you and put together a response for you to argue to the CAC that the complaint against you should be dismissed. I hope that it helps you out. Good luck to you.

Introduction

Complainant Marc Randazza has improperly filed a UDRP complaint with the Czech Arbitration Center. Jurisdiction in the CAC is not proper because neither the respondent nor the complainant have ties to the Czech Republic. In addition, Complainant Marc Randazza has ties to illegal activity and Ms. Cox has a right to freedom of speech.

Facts
In late 2011, complainant Marc Randazza approached respondent, Ms. Crystal Cox, about representing her in an appeal of a judgment against her in the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Randazza then went behind Ms. Cox's back and began speaking with the opposing party without Ms. Cox's permission, and Ms. Cox terminated their professional relationship. Cox has absolute evidence that Randazza conspired to set her up in a criminal case and that he conspired with the corrupt judge in the case so that her rights would be violated. For this reason alone, the complaint must be dismissed. 

Randazza has known ties to organized crime, is a criminal, and is suspected of participation in a number of unethical acts. He has been a representative of the pornography industry, thus demonstrating a lack of moral character. In his representation of pornographers, he has set up Gay teenagers for suicide, has extorted millions of dollars from innocent parties, and uses his law license as a tool of cyber bullying, terrorism, and criminal activity. This prosecution is the latest in a long line of his incredible acts of moral turpitude and crime. Not only should the complaint be denied, but the Czech Arbitration Court should impose sanctions upon Randazza under Czech Code which provides for sanctions of attorneys who bring frivolous actions against innocent parties. 

1. Elliot Bernstein is not a proper party to this case.

Elliot Bernstein is not a proper party to this case, and for that reason the claims should be denied. Bernstein is the registered name owner of two of the domain names, but as the Court can see, Cox is the publisher of them. BUT, the actual case has to be brought against the real name holder or the party in interest, but it is up to the Complainant to make that distinction. Under ICANN Rule 3.7.7.3, Randazza could have simply asked Bernstein to reveal the underlying owner, and Bernstein would have done so. But, since Randazza was too lazy to do this, his complaint has a fatal flaw that can never be overcome. 

2. Jurisdiction in the Czech Republic is not proper because neither party meets the sufficient minimal contacts test.

Due Process requires that, in order for a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that "he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend „traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‟" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945). Because neither Randazza nor Cox reside in the Czech Republic, this court has no jurisdiction over either of them, nor over this dispute. 

The Supreme Court of the United States (A country of which both Randazza and Cox are citizens) has held that before a court has the power to exert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must "Purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires certain "minimum contacts" between a nonresident defendant and the forum state in order that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," are not offended. See International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This "Purposeful Availment Test" examines whether the defendant's voluntary actions reasonably and foreseeably create liability in the forum state. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). This Test protects a defendant from being haled into another state (or country's) court unjustly. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980)).

The minimum contacts constitutional requirement serves two objectives: "[I]t protects against the burdens of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum" unless the defendants contacts to the forum state make it just and fair to force him or her to defend a cause of action, and "it acts to ensure that the states, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system." See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 

Plaintiff Randazza seeks exactly what the due process clause prohibits, a discard of any notion of due process in order to punitively subject the Cox to litigation in an inconvenient forum. 

DUE PROCESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CYBER JOURNALISM

As noted above, the Plaintiff's position demonstrates a a desire to continue unethical behavior to set up the Defendant. Randazza might thing that due process is not due to Cox, this is not the case in real life or on the Internet. Using technology to lead to "the eventual demise on all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction" can not stand. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). To determine jurisdiction in the Internet age, the Court must recognize that the Internet is not restricted by distance or state boundaries. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) ("Cyberspace is accessible to anyone, located anywhere, with an Internet connection"). 

The world wide nature of Internet use makes it a unique mode of communication unlike newspapers, mail, radio, television, and other media. See Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F.Supp.2d 907, 914(D. Or. 1999). Speech on the Internet targets no jurisdiction in particular and everyone in any geographic location. See Id. 

Given Internet, and the special position granted to matters of free speech, the Court must recognize that this case touches upon time-worn legal issues in a manner not thoroughly resolved the existing law. See generally, David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996) ("Cyberspace has no territorial based boundaries, because of the cost and speed of message transmission on the Internet is almost entirely independent of physical location"). 

Even if an internet speaker sought to avoid jurisdiction in a certain country, there is little to nothing that he could do in order to limit his Website's accessibility in a selected state where the publisher may wish to avoid jurisdiction. See Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce, found at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/1/nunberg-g.html. (January 1, 2001) (Discussing the limitations and failures of filtering technology) (last visited, October 17, 2004). 

THE "EFFECTS TEST"

The predominant pre-internet test for jurisdiction, occasionally relied upon in the internet context is the effects test as established by Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In this case, an editor and a writer for the National Enquirer, both residents of Florida, were sued in California for libel arising out of an article published in The Enquirer about Shirley Jones, a resident of California. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The United States Supreme Court upheld the determination of personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they had "expressly aimed" their conduct towards California. Id. at 789. 

Relying on the fact that The Enquirer had its largest circulation in California, distributing over 600,000 copies of its publication in that state, the court noted that the defendants knew the harm of their allegedly tortuous activity would be felt there. Id. at 789-90. 

A key distinction in the case at bar is that the The National Enquirer was availing itself of the privilege of operating in California, as it shipped 600,000 copies into that state. 

The National Enquirer purposefully availed itself of the business of doing business in California when it delivered both subscriptions and newsstand copies with a great degree of regularity into that state. If The National Enquirer wished to avoid the likelihood of being haled into a California court, the publication could simply cease publication in California, but its publication in all 49 other states would be unfettered. 

If this court were to accept a simplistic interpretation of Calder in an Internet context, a nonresident defendant would always be subject to jurisdiction in the Czech Arbitration Court simply because the plaintiff's wanted to bring a claim in the Czech Arbitration Court. See, e.g., Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. 

Power Co., 253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, given the nature of the internet, the only way to avoid jurisdiction in any country would be to not speak on matters critical of any entity in any other country - an end result that would chill free speech to an extent impermissible by the First Amendment. This would, in effect, result in this Court licensing "one side of a debate to fight free style, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." See R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 

This is a position which is counter to the protections of free speech enshrined in the First Amendment. See Id. Accordingly, if this court chose to apply the effects test, this case should most certainly fail due to the strong distinction between the print medium evaluated in Calder and the internet medium in the case at bar.

THE "ZIPPO TEST"

Many courts have taken notice of the unique qualities of the Internet when making decisions regarding personal jurisdiction. The most commonly used approach to determine whether purposeful availment exists in a Website context is the so-called "Zippo Test." This Test was originally articulated in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 

In this case, the Western District of Pennsylvania concluded that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Id. at 1124.

 The court described a sliding continuum for the evaluation of whether jurisdiction should attach. At one end of this spectrum are defendants that clearly conduct business over the Internet. For example, a defendant that may knowingly and repeatedly transmit computer files over the Internet into a forum state, thus creating jurisdiction. Id. (citing Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 

This test has been met with extensive approval in World wide, but especially in Florida, where Randazza's law firm is based out of.   See, e.g., Miller v. Berman, 289 F.Supp.2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (applying the Zippo Test and rejecting jurisdiction in circumstances where the defendant published a web page accessible in Florida, but did not regularly conduct business in the State of Florida); Hartoy, Inc., v. Thompson, 2003 WL 21468079 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (unpublished opinion recognizing and applying the Zippo Test); Miami Breakers Soccer Club, Inc., v. Women's United Soccer Ass'n, 140 F.Supp.2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (applying the Zippo Test to a passive Website and rejecting jurisdiction); J.B. Oxford Holdings, Inc., v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F.Supp.2d 1363, (S.D. Fla. 1999) (applying the Zippo Test and rejecting jurisdiction over a Website that provided the ability for readers to email questions to the defendant, download demonstrations from the defendant, and receive free information about day trading from the defendant). 

At the opposite end of the spectrum are simple passive Websites which are merely accessible by users in all jurisdictions. These passive Websites do little more than make information available to any who may be interested in receiving the information and do not create sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction to attach. See Zippo at 1124 (citing Bensusan Rest Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 404, 409 (ND Miss. 2000) (publication of allegedly defamatory material on a website, under the due process clause, does not create sufficient contacts with the forum state since the site was passive and not designed to attract business); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (web page accessible in the forum state, causing potential harm in the forum state does not create liability in the forum state).

In the middle are interactive Websites where users can exchange information with the host site. In all but the clearest cases, an evaluating court must make a finding that the defendant is somehow expressly targeting internet users in the forum state and not just making itself accessible to everyone. Mere interactivity, without more does not slide the scale toward establishment of minimum contacts. 

See, e.g., Bancroft and Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (Interactivity is insufficient by itself, there must be "express aiming" at forum state); Hy Cite Corp. v. BadBusinessBureau.com, LLC, 297 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1161 (W.D. Wis. 2004). "However the ultimate question remains the same, that is, whether the defendant's contacts with the state are of such quality and nature such that it could reasonably expect to be haled into the courts of the forum state." Id. It is clear that the law does not allow jurisdiction over Crystal Cox in the Czech Republic! Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

The purposeful availment requirement is established if the defendant purposefully creates sufficient minimum contacts with Florida in order to create "a substantial connection" with this state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76. The whole constitutional reason for "purposeful availment" requirement is so that the decisions of all states have some measure of predictability and notice that they may be subject to suit in a foreign jurisdiction. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, at 297 (1980). If citizens believe that the risks of litigation in a fora are too likely, citizens of other states may sever any connection to unfavorable forum states. Id. at 297. 

As discussed above, since Cox is technologically unable to limit where in the world her cyber-journalism and Citizen Journalism would be accessed, it is a pre-internet mode of thinking that the defendant could have severed connection to the Czech Republic to avoid jurisdiction here. This is simply illogical in the context of allowing free-expression to thrive without unreasonably and unlawfully chilling all speech on the internet.
Neither Ms. Cox nor attorney Randazza have the minimum contacts necessary to meet the test described in International Shoe. Attorney Randazza currently lives in Nevada, and his law firm is in Florida (and how that is ethical is uncertain). Ms. Cox is a resident of Montana. Neither of them has a connection to the Czech Republic, and Ms. Cox is certainly not "at home" in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes does not have personal jurisdiction over either party, and filing the complaint in the Czech Republic was not proper. 

2. Because Complainant Marc Randazza has ties to illegal activity, he cannot claim legitimate rights to his name as a famous mark.

The doctrine that plaintiff must come into a court of equity with "clean hands" is a reflection of the equitable nature of trademark law. A plaintiff who requests the assistance of a court of equity must not himself be guilty of inequitable conduct. Furthermore, keeping in mind the equitable nature of trademark rights, "misuse" of those rights is a recognized defense. 

Misuse includes activities that may themselves be the basis of a counterclaim, for example, enforcement of a fraudulently obtained registration, and use in violation of other laws. However, at least one court has stated that trademark misuse cannot be used affirmatively. 

In his complaint, Randazza claims that he has shown that his name is a trademark because he is a public individual. HE IS a public individual, and thus his name might function as a trademark, but his name is also associated with pornography, criminality, slander, and libel. Therefore, under New York Times v. Sullivan, in order for him to win this case, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Cox acted with actual malice, knowing that her actions could constitute a violation of law. Since her actions had no violation of law in them, there is no possibility that Randazza can ever prevail over her under this standard. 

Further, because of Randazza's obvious ties with the mafia, he is not using his name in a legitimate manner. Ms. Cox is in fear for her life because of Randazza's ties with the Mafia. Additionally, he has sent out a ring of bloggers and stalkers to harass Ms. Cox constantly. Most notably, someone connected to Randazza threatened to break Ms. Cox's legs in a conspiracy with the well-known criminal, Kenneth White, who is a blatant apologist for Randazza. Therefore, Randazza is not making a legitimate use of his name and should not be entitled to rights to it.

Common antitrust misuse defense alleges that the suit brought by plaintiff was brought in bad faith as part of an attempt to monopolize or restrain trade or to shut down or set up an innocent party. A Plaintiff may try to combat this defense by claiming immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts, which immunizes him from antitrust liability based on his filing suit against defendant. 

The immunity conferred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, is not absolute. There is an exception to the doctrine known as the "sham exception": if the lawsuit is a mere sham brought to harass a competitor and damage competition, it will not qualify for Noerr-Pennington immunity. Furthermore, a "no sham" ruling does not bar a later malicious prosecution suit based on false testimony not addressed by the court in the initial "no sham" ruling. 

The meaning of the "sham" exception was clarified by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in the Columbia Pictures case. There, the Court set out a two-part test for sham:

1. the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant would realistically expect success on the merits; and

2. the baseless lawsuit must conceal an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of government process.

Randazza is clearly trying to interefere directly with Cox and her business relationships. As has been demonstrated by Cox on many occasions, Randazza is a criminal minded and unethical attorney. He has conspired to set her up for extortion. He has worked with her enemies while her attorney and violated the sacred oath of attorney client privilege! How can anything ever be as unclean handed and underhanded, and 

3. Because the European Union recognizes freedom of speech, Marc Randazza should not be allowed to take the Disputed Domain Name from Ms. Cox.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 11 provides that "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." and "2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected." 

Further, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees that "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 

This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises." This language is similar to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Respondent Ms. Cox is an investigative journalist who has made it her life's work to provide truthful information to the public about individuals who have acted improperly. She has a number of successful blogs where she disseminates this information to the public. She is a whistleblower and an agent of the truth.  COX IS A MINISTER, and thus NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT.

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar suits brought against Ministers, as does the Czech Constitution and the United Nations treaty on civil rights. 

Government interference with a Minister is an impermissible mixture of church and state. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich,426 U. S. 696. Pp. 10-12.

(c) Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other employment discrimination laws, Courts find that suits against Ministers on matters of religious conviction are can not be maintained. The First Amendment itself, gives special solicitude to the rights of religious clergy members, of which Cox is obviously one (the domains are owned by REVEREND Crystal Cox!) 

Because Cox is a legitimate minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this claim. The ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation. 

Conclusion

This court should dismiss the complaint because Randazza made an error about the parties, jurisdiction is not proper in the Czech Republic, Randazza is involved with illegal activity, and Ms. Cox has a right to freedom of speech, Cox is a religious minister and thus immune from suit."

Marc Randazza Email was Send to me from a Blog Reader.

Here are a Few more Blogs regarding Marc Randazza, that Marc Randazza has not had deleted or shut down YET, key word being YET.

http://www.fuckmarcrandazza.com/

http://marcrandazzafreespeech.blogspot.com/

http://www.marcrandazzasucks.com/

marcrandazzaviolatedmylegalrights.blogspot.com

http://www.bloggersrights.com/2012/03/marc-randazza-defends-rush-limbaugh-in.html

http://ethicscomplaint.blogspot.com/2012/06/marc-j-randazza-randazza-legal-group.html

http://www.defamationdefense.com/search/label/Marc%20Randazza

http://marcrandazzaegomaniac.blogspot.com/

http://marcrandazza.blogspot.com/

http://marcrandazzaliedaboutcrystalcox.blogspot.com/

MarcRandazza.com

RandazzaLegalGroupSucks.com 

Posted here by
Investigative Blogger
Reverend Crystal L. Cox
SavvyBroker@Yahoo.com 

Marc J. Randazza Responds to Matthew A. Kaplan, Esq. regarding Glen Beck WIPO Dispute. Get your Hip Waders, YOU will Need Em'

Marc J. Randazza Responds to Glen Beck WIPO
Hmm.. do you see anything possibly hypocritical in all this ?

Marc Randazza sure does not believe I have these same rights. Guess I should hire Marc Randazza to represent me against Marc Randazza, ya I know I am sooo Funny.

Let's take a look at a few things that Attorney Marc Randazza has to say when it comes to Domain Name owners rights in cases that do not involve domain names with the name Marc Randazza in the Domain Name. Ready ?

You may want to have a shovel handy and wear hip waders.

" View 1 states: “The right to criticize does not extend to registering a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the owner’s registered trademark or conveys an association with the mark.”

View 2 states: “Irrespective of whether the domain name as such connotes criticism, the respondent has a legitimate interest in using the trademark as part of the domain name of a criticism site if the use is fair and non-commercial.”

Naturally, View 2 is the prevailing view of American panelists and panels that apply American law to UDRP proceedings. View 1 seems to be more popular with international panelists and panels that apply European law.

Unfortunately, given that UDRP decisions regularly incorporate international legal principles, this case could be assigned to a foreign panelist or to an American panelist who applies transnational principles. I personally would find it distressing if the panel were to make a decision that completely disregards the U.S. Constitution in favor of a foreign perspective that adopts View 1."

Hmmm.. Ok so Marc Randazza, First Amendment Attorney and self proclaimed Free Speech Advocate files a domain name dispute in a Czech Arbitration Court ( a foreign panelist) and it sure looks to me that Marc Randazza did this in order to go directly AGAINST the U.S. Constitution.

Marc Randazza tries to claim I have made money from his not so famous alleged brand. Yet that is simply not true, I have made no money from that domain name and have in fact lost money. I still own the name now because Marc Randazza had Godaddy lock the name, otherwise I would have sold it for 12 Million Dollars.. maybe if I win the right to keep the name I can sell it to a porn connoisseur ( breath, it's Parody ).

The use of MarcRandazza.com is FAIR and non-commercial and Marc Randazza knows it.. he is grasping at straws to redeem his very bad name .. that he claims is his good name and boy is Marc Randazza lying constantly.

In the Glen Beck Case Marc Randazza says, "I personally would find it distressing if the panel were to make a decision that completely disregards the U.S. Constitution in favor of a foreign perspective that adopts View 1."

YET it's not so distressing when the Constitution is disregarded to protect the ego of whiny baby attorney Marc Randazza.

In the Glen Beck Case Documents, Marc Randazza goes on to say, "To be candid, we found the fact that Mr. Beck filed this action at all to be most puzzling. Although, it was obvious why he did not file in a U.S. court given the law surrounding nominative fair use of trademarks as fully explained in our Brief. Naturally, a defamation claim as alluded to in Mr. Beck’s complaint would be humiliatingly doomed as well in a U.S. court. "

Hmmm.. so Marc Randazza, Hypocritical Attorney finds it puzzling that a man would try and get a domain name with his name in it, yet Marc Randazza sure is not seeming puzzled when the domain name has Marc Randazza in it. Surely a defamation claim would be humiliating to dumb ol' Marc Randazza.

And it all seems so obvious now as to why Marc Randazza did not file in a U.S. Court.

The above document is so Full of Shit, as Marc Randazza seems to be taking the opposite side of it all now... poor baby.. afraid of a girl buying a domain name and has to file a protective order.. IN HIS HOUR OF TERROR !!! ( as Seen on Nationally Syndicated NPR )

Hypocrite Marc Randazza goes on to say, "Accordingly, we found it to be most ironic that Mr. Beck, facing the fact that the U.S. Constitution would stand in his way in a U.S. court, sought to bring this action before an international domain name arbitration panel.

On March 20, 2009, he said on his show:

     Let me tell you something. When you can't win with the people, you
     bump it up to the courts. When you can't win with the courts, you
     bump it up to the international level.

Of course, we levy no critique at Mr. Beck for seeking to vindicate his perceived rights in this forum. We do not share his opinion as articulated on March 30, and we respect his creativity in seeking an alternate avenue where his claims might have a chance of success. Unfortunately, despite the general wisdom among UDRP panelists, we find that occasionally they render decisions that make First Amendment champions cringe."

So is Marc Randazza claiming to be a First Amendment Champion. REALLY ? Is that what your Going with Dipshit ?

Well, Folks Marc Randazza is certainly NOT a First Amendment Champion.

Marc Randazza got a whole lot of my blogs shut down because he did not like me complaining about Marc J. Randazza. Marc Randazza filed a protective order against me.

Marc Randazza threatened me in private emails on making him an enemy. Marc Randazza gathered a lynch mob, lying about my motives and attacked me online, in my my post office mail, my email, and in world wide blogs and forums.

Marc Randazza lied to a Forbes reporter and painted me in false light as if I had attacked a child. Marc Randazza accused me of extortion when Marc Randazza himself offered to buy the domain name and I said NO.

Marc Randazza has been on a rant for nearly a year now just because of a domain name. And all this to suppress my Free Speech rights, my First Amendment rights and in essence has violated the rights of all bloggers and citizens and has so far set some pretty bad precedence.

Marc Randazza is the one that "facing the fact that the U.S. Constitution would stand in his way in a U.S. court, sought to bring this action before an international domain name arbitration panel " .

Marc Randazza wanted to violated my constitutional rights, therefore Marc Randazza brought this "ACTION" before an international domain name arbitration panel. "Of Course" I "Levy no Critique" at Marc Randazza for "seeking to vindicate his perceived rights in this forum".

Marc Randazza, Alleged First Amendment Rights Attorney and Advocate of Free Speech, certainly seems to be making REAL First Amendment Champions, such as myself, CRINGE.

A Few more quotes from the document above as Marc Randazza blathers on, in defense of his client, yet now in a hypocritical rant fights for the exact opposite against Blogger, Super Hero Crystal L. Cox, the "REAL" Free Speech Champion.

"We are certain that despite our disagreement with Mr. Beck’s legal position, that all parties involved hold equal reverence for the First Amendment. Therefore, I have prepared a proposed stipulation that will ensure that no matter which panelist is assigned to this case, the First Amendment will illuminate these proceedings like rays of light from the Torch of Liberty."

Drama, Drama, Drama Queen !!!

"I am certain that neither party wishes to see First Amendment rights subordinated to international trademark principles, thus unwittingly proving Mr. Beck’s point. Lest this case become an example of international law causing damage to the constitutional rights that both of our clients hold dear, I respectfully request that your client agree to stipulate to the application of American constitutional law to this case. "

Don't you throw up a bit when hypocritical, down right EVIL lying lawyers such as Marc John Randazza, sign their Blather and Yammering with "Sincerely," Marc John Randazza

Blah.. Blah.. Blah..

Full Freedom

http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/4Volokh_a.pdf

MarcRandazza.com, Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group. MarcRandazza.com and the War with Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and Internet Savvy Blogger Crystal Cox Rages On. MarcRandazza.com is the domain name that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group was just not SAVVY enough to Buy. So Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is fighting Free Speech Rights of all, so that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group can STEAL MarcRandazza.com. Expose Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group. Email your Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group tip to Blogger Crystal Cox.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, an unEthical Attorney.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza had a phone interview with me, Blogger Crystal Cox, to determine if Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza wanted or could take the Obsidian Finance Vs. Crystal Cox case on appeal.

After Crystal Cox spoke with Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group, I bought MarcRandazza.com, because it was available and I wanted to use the domain name to further the cause of the case and Free Speech rights.

Then, soon after this call, in a highly unethical manner, Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group contacted the Plaintiff in Obsidian V. Cox, without letting Crystal Cox know that he was doing so, or even representing her.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group gave away privileged information, negotiated my case and Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group gave private information.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group did not contact me to let me know he represented me. Yet Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group told members of the First Amendment bar that he, Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group did represent Crystal Cox.

Meanwhile, I Crystal Cox Blogger, had picked another attorney who had previously contacted me. This attorney contacted Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group about his yapping to the First Amendment Bar in representing me.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group claimed, indeed that he did represent Blogger Crystal Cox, me. Which was in no way True. 

Just after this conversation Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza sent me, Crystal L. Cox an email saying that he Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group would represent me Crystal Cox on appeal.

I told Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group that I did not want Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group to represent me, as I had chose another attorney who had treated me with dignity and respect.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group pretended to be fine with this decision. And Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group told me that all was fine with it. We had spoke previously about my marketing abilities.

And so about a month after Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group acted as if he was fine that I chose another attorney, I emailed Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and asked Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group if he had use for internet marketing in his business. He said he did not need internet marketing for his firm and he demanded that I give him MarcRandazza.com, even though Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group had never bought that domain name in all these years as an alleged Internet Lawyer and Domain Name Expert, Hmmm !!!!

When I refused to Give him the domain name, Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group got very mad and threatened me. He said you really want to make an enemy of me, in that purely mafia style threatening manner. After this, to teach me a lesson Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group  conspired with the Plaintiff in Obsidian V. Cox to set me up for Extortion.

And Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group had no proof that any such thing happened. In fact, blogger Crystal Cox, me, had not written anything to EXPOSE Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group until Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group offered to join the Plaintiff and set up his own alleged client.

Blogger Crystal Cox NEVER offered to remove anything she had written online about Marc Randazza for MONEY. I even refused his offer to buy the Domain Name.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group continues to lie and claim that blogger Crystal Cox, me, wanted money to remove information. However Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is flat out lying. I had not written one word about Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group until he conspired to set me up and harm me and I defended myself in the search engines.

 I felt extremely compelled to set the record RIGHT, get my side of the story in the search engines and to expose Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and how he treats his clients.

How can Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group justify using his alleged clients information to set them up for things they did not do and how can Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group use information he was given in confidence as a weapon to ruin the life of his client, or client to be?

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group's hypocritical actions led me to buy more Domain Names to make fun of Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and his lack of knowledge in Domain Name Law, Intellectual Property and Free Speech rights as proven by the fact that he never bought that domain name, and that he got my blogs and accounts shut down to suppress MY free speech. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group even filed for a protective order out of Las Vegas in order to suppress Free Speech.

It sure seems that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group will go to any lengths to SUPPRESS Free Speech. If that Free Speech is about Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

Yet Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group defends others to have the same right to own domain names with other people's name in it. Seriously, it is blatantly obvious that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is a hypocrite.

How in the world can Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group claim to be an advocate of Free Speech when Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group has done everything he can, short of taking my life, in order to suppress my Free Speech Rights.

To further my point that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group was ill equipped at domain name law, I purchased the domain name of his child and his wife. Of which I created a Blog on JenniferRandazza.com, to, again prove that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group did not have the skills he proclaimed to have in this Internet Legal World. The other domain name, was NEVER, ever published in any way by me. Yet Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group flat out lied to big media and claimed that I did publish this domain name. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group painted blogger Crystal Cox, me, in False Light deliberatly. Yet, Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group has no accountability.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group ruins lives. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group spreads lies about his clients and ex-clients and with seemingly no remorse.

After having made my point that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is an Idiot. I, Blogger Crystal Cox deleted the domain name that allegedly was dumbass Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group's darkest hour of terror. And I gave away JenniferRandazza.com, the name of the wife of Free Speech / Domain Name Attorney Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group's wife.  I gave the name away to further the cause of exposing injustice in the Porn Industry and to help expose stalking and activities of those connected to Randazza Legal Group's J. Malcolm Devoy.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is said to have stolen that domain name from a GoDaddy Account, with the help of a Godaddy Employee Allegedly.

I gave MarcRandazza.com to the same person for the same reasons. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group seemed to have threatened this person and even posted on chat sites the persons car and make of care and wishing them death. So in fear they returned the domain name to me. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group then filed an Arbritration complaint to steal the Domain name MarcRandazza.com that  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group  was to dumb to buy.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group claims to be an Advocate of Free Speech, however, Blogger Crystal Cox knows that to be an absolute falsehood.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group  shut down one of my Google accounts, simply because I made fun of and exposed Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group had my wordpress blogs shut down because Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group did not like me exposing the actions, hypocrisy and butt hurt of Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group lied to Forbes regarding Crystal Cox.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group has lied to the world about me. Nothing I can do but tell the Truth, the whole Truth and have Faith.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group lied to a national radio program regarding the actions of Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group claimed in the Sandra Fluke case that Butthurt does not pay. Yet Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is butthurt and stealing intellectual property over it.  Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is butthurt and ruining lives over it.

Do your homework BEFORE you even speak to Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.  Blogger Crystal Cox claims that Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group has so many connections that the law and the constitution is irrelevant. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group lies to big media and they eat it up. Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group whines to anyone who will believe Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group's flat out lies.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group has inside connections everywhere and will get your blog shut down, will steal your domain names, and Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group will violate your constitutional rights, your Free Speech rights. And all under the guise of Free Speech Advocate.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT a good man.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT an honest attorney.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT a Free Speech Advocate.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT a Truth Teller.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT a domain name law expert.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, NOT an advocate of the Constitutional Rights of All.

Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group is, in my Opinion, a hypocrite and will do anything to silence Free Speech when that Free Speech is telling on Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

Do your home work regarding Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.  Find your own facts about Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group. Read the cases of Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and decide for yourself if the actions of Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group against blogger Crystal Cox seem to be hypocritical.

Got a tip regarding Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group OR J. Malcolm Devoy? Email your Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group OR J. Malcolm Devoy tip to Crystal Cox at SavvyBroker@Yahoo.com .

Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox is dedicated to EXPOSING Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group, and J. Malcolm Devoy.

If Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group OR J. Malcolm Devoy find a way to make me disappear. I trust my readers will take up the reigns in Exposing Marc J. Randazza, Marc John Randazza, Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group and J. Malcolm Devoy.

"Non-Lawyer pro se litigants not to be held to same standards as a practicing lawyer

Many pro se litigants will use this in their pleadings; "Pleadings in this
case are being filed by Plaintiff In Propria Persona, wherein pleadings are
to be considered without regard to technicalities. Propria, pleadings are
not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as practicing
lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner 92 Sct 594, also See Power 914 F2d 1459 (11th
Cir1990), also See Hulsey v. Ownes 63 F3d 354 (5th Cir 1995). also See In
Re: HALL v. BELLMON 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991)." 

In Puckett v. Cox, it was held that a pro-se pleading requires less
stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth
Circuit USCA). Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957)
"The Federal Rules rejects the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits." According to Rule 8(f) FRCP and the State Court rule which
holds that all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice." 

Defense against dismissal of complaint under Rule 12-B

There is legal sufficiency to show Plaintiff is entitled to relief under his
Complaint. A Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) also Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 1832 (1989). Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a
judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. In applying the
Conley standard, the Court will "accept the truth of the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the Complaint." 

On Judicial Immunity

Civil Rights Vol 4, US Supreme Court Digest
    Page 555 Judges not totally Immune

87 SCT 1213 Pierson v. Ray

94 SCT 1683 Scheur v. Rhodes

96 SCT 984 Imbler v. Pathtman

98 SCT 2018 Monell v. Social SVS

98 SCT 2894 Butz v. Economov

On Absolute Immunity for Judges

A complaint is actionable against Judges under Title 42 U.S.C. 1985 (3),
whose immunity does not extend to conspiracy under color of law. Section
1985(3) reaches both conspiracies under color of law and conspiracies
effectuated through purely private conduct.

On Judges violation of oath of office

Many judges have a total disregard for their oath of office under Title 28
Section 453, All judges take this oath of office swearing to uphold the U.S.
Constitution.

Arbitrary Exercise of Government Powers

Missouri v. Mackey, 127 US 205, 8 S Ct 1161

Minneapolis v. Herrick, 127 US 210, 8 S Ct 1176

Lepper v. Texas 139 US 462, 11 S Ct 577

Giozza v Tiernan, 148 US 657, 13 S Ct 721

Duncan v Missouri, 152 US 377, 14 S Ct 570

Pro Se litigants entitled to Fees:

Pro se litigants may be entitled to Attorney fees and costs under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended 42 USC 1988 

U.S. Constitutional Issues:

The Fifth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." Due process is
denied when a meaningful hearing is denied as in this cause.

The Seventh Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
to trial by jury shall be preserved..." This language does not include a
single reference to "manipulation" of a jury by the Court in a conspiracy
with lawyers to design a verdict suitable to the Court through the use of
lawyer rules, judicial rules, court rules, or otherwise trumped-up legal
technicalities and instructions which effectively "handcuffs" the jury. All
of these activities are no more or less than a denial of the right to a jury
of peers with the constitutional authority to judge both the facts and law
in a case.

The Thirteenth Amendment, provides in pertinent part that "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime....., shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction".
These judges through their private conduct in conspiracy with the lawyer
defendants, caused the Court to effectuate this Plaintiff to "Compulsory
Involuntary Servitude", an act punishable under Title 18 1584 as a criminal act.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Equal Protection clause
(Section 1), expressly declares no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law..."

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3, provides in pertinent part that "No
person shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or
under any State.....who, having previously taken an oath,....as an executive
or judicial officer of any State to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same...."

USC 14th Ammendment (Deprived of the use of property)

Tracy v. Ginzberg 205 US 170, 27 S Ct. 461

Wagner v Leser, 239 US 207, 36 S Ct 66

Fuentes v. Shevin 407 US 67, 92 S Ct 1983

Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 99 S Ct 698, 11 Ohio Ops 3rd 302

Kent.Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 US 454, 109 S Ct 1904

What constitutes property protected under constitution?

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36

Buchanan v Warley, 245 US 60, 38 S Ct 16

Liggett Co. v Baldridge, 278 US 105, 49 S Ct 57

Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 92 S Ct 2701

On Due Process Violation 5th and 14th

Butler v. Perry, 240 US 328, 36 S Ct 288

Brinkerhoff- Faris Trust v Hill, 281 US 673, 50 S Ct 451

Curry v. McCanless, 307 US 357, 59 S Ct 900

*Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 72 S Ct 25, Alr2d 1396

*Ivanho Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 US 275, 78 S CT 1174

*Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121, 79 S Ct 676

*Gault 387 US 1, 87 S Ct 1428

*Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 94 S Ct 2963

**Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 98 S Ct 663

**Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 US 57, 101 S Ct 2646

**States v. Goodwin 457 US 368, 102 S Ct 2485

**Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 107 S Ct 515

**DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 US 189, 109 S Ct 998

**Collins v Harker, 112 S Ct. 1061

Jurisdiction of the case (Basic element of due process)

Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527

Sense of fairplay shocked is not due process (Congress Barred)

Galvan v Press, 347 US 522, 74 S Ct 737

Groban 352 US 330, 77 S Ct 510

Kinsella v United States, 361 US 234, 80 S Ct 297

Bodie v Conneticut, 401 US 371, 91 S Ct 780

Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 94 S Ct 2437

United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 107 S Ct 2095

14th Ammendment is the due process denial right

Collins v. Harker 112 S Ct 1061

Hebert v Louisiana, 272 US 312, 47 S Ct 103

Georgia Power v Decatur, 281 US 505, 50 S Ct 369

Discrimination as Violation of Due Process (5th Ammendment)

Bowling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 74 S Ct 693

Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 84 S Ct 1187

Shipiro v Thompson 394 US 618, 89 S ct 1322

United States v Moreno, 413 US 528, 93 S Ct 2821

Johnson v Robinson 415 US 361, 94 S Ct 1160

Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 96 S Ct 612

Mathews v De Castro, 429 US 181, 97 S Ct 431

Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 100 S Ct 2758

Lyng v Castillo, 477 US 635, 106 S Ct 2727

Fourteenth Ammendment and 42 USCS 1983

Statutory requirement under color of law: Lugar v Edmondson Oil, 457 US 922, 102 S Ct 2744

Civil Rights Issues:
    A Continuance of Constitutional Issues

Title 42 USC 1983 provides in relevant part that: "every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State....subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. ..shall
be liable to the party injured...."

A Title 42 1985 action which seeks compensatory and punitive damages in
conjunction with equitable relief as in this case is considered a legal
claim, entititling Plaintiff to a jury trial. See An-Ti v. Michigan
Technological Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137.

Plaintiff alleges a "class based", invidiously discriminatory animus is
behind the conspirators' action as the Court records reflect. That the
actions were clearly a product of bias and prejudice of the Court. See
Griffen v. Breckridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)

The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic 113 S.Ct.753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not
restricted to "race" discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that 1985 (3) may be used for "class-based" claims other than race which is
alleged in this case.

The defendant lawyers acting in conspiracy with state actors under color of
law have become state actors in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that "private parties", lawyers in this case, may be held to the same
standard of "state actors" where the final and decisive act was carried out
in conspiracy with a state actor or state official. See Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct., 183 also See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 90 S.Ct. 1598.

Plaintiff's Complaint is based in part on discrimination and political
affiliations by lawyers and lawyer-judges, under 42 USCA 1983 & 1985. See
reversal case Acevedo-Diaz v Aponte (1993, CA1 Puerto Rico) 1 F3d 62,
summary op at (CA1 Puerto Rico) 21 M.L.W. 3212, 14 R.I.L.W. 389.

Section 1985(3) under Title 42 reaches both conspiracies under color of law
and conspiracies effectuated through purely private conduct. In this case
Plaintiff has alleged a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus is
behind the conspirators' action as the court records reflect. That
actionable cause is the treatment of a non-lawyer pro se litigant as a
distinct "class-based subject" of the Court, wherein denial of equal
protection of the laws and denial of due process was clearly the product of
bias and prejudice of the Court. See Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102 (1971).

The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993) that the standard announced in Griffen was not
restricted to "race" discrimination. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that 1985(3) may be used for "class-based" claims other than race as alleged
in this case. It is also important to note in Bray the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the requirement under 1985(3) that a private conspiracy be
one "for the purpose of depriving... any person or "class" of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws, which the Court said mandates "an intent to deprive persons of a
right guaranteed against private impairment.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Griffen emphasized 1985(3)
legislative history was directed to the prevention of deprivations which
shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation
of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen,
to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his
and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of remedies... Id. at 100.

Supreme Court has ruled that "private parties" may be held to the same
standard of "state actors" in cases such as the instant cause where the
final and decisive act was carried out in conspiracy with a state official.
See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct., 183 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598.

Jurisdictional Issues:
It is proper for this District Court to take Jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person. See Title 28 Section
1343 (1)(2)(3)(4) .

Jurisdiction is proper under Title 28 Sections 1332, 1335, 1357, 1441 and 1603.

The First issue is "Convenience" and second issue is the "interest-of-
justice" standard under 28 USCA 1406.

Dismissal Issues:

The Complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that
Plaintiffs would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that
could be proved in support of the claims. See Gomez v Toledo (1980, US) 64 L
Ed 2d 572, 100 S Ct 1920.

The allegations of a Complaint prepared by a state prisoner acting pro se
are generally taken as true for purposes of motion to dismiss. See Hughes v
Rowe (1980, US) 66 L Ed 2d 163, 101 S Ct 173.

RULE 60

The final judgement of this Court should be vacated under Rule 60(B). The
Court is requested to weigh the interest in substantial justice against the
simple need for preserving finality of the judgement. See Expenditures
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institute, 1974, 500 F.2d.
808, 163 U.S. App.D.C.140. See also Brown v. Clark Equipment Co., D.C. Mc.
1982, 961 F.R.D. 166.

Court -a judgement to dismiss because of some trumped up technicality giving
excuse to dismiss a non-lawyer pro se litigant's complaint with merit in a
lawyer dominated Court hearing. In support of Plaintiffs Motion to vacate
Judgement, the following cases are offered; Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway,
(151 F2d.240) Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The ruling of the court in this case held; "Where a plaintiff pleads pro se
in a suit for protection of civil rights, the court should endeavor to
construe the Plaintiff's pleading without regard to technicalities." In
Walter Process Equipment v. Food Machinery 382 U.S. 172 (1965) it was held
that in a "motion to dismiss", the material allegations of the complaint are
taken as admitted."

Rico Case Law:

The defendants constitute an illegal enterprise in acts or threat of acts in
violation of Civil Rico Federal Racketeering Act USC 18, 1961-1963 et seq.
The following are particular violations:

18 USC 241: Conspiracy against Rights of Citizens:

18 USC 3: Accessory after the fact, knowing that an offense has been
committed against the United States, relieves, receives, comforts or assists
the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment.

18 USC 242: Deprivation of Rights color of law of rights protected under the
Constitution of the U.S.

18 USC 512: Tampering with a witness

18 USC 1341: Mail fraud

18 USC 1343: Wire fraud

18 USC 1503: Obstruction of justice

18 USC 1510: Obstructing of criminal investigation

18 USC 1513: Retaliating against a witness, victim or informant

18 USC 1951: Interference with interstate commerce

18 USC 1621: Perjury

18 USC 1001: Fraud

Continued statute of limitation in ongoing activity (conspiracy) (bankruptcy fraud)

============================================================================
TOPIC: Judicial Notice: definition
==============================================================================

Judicial Notice is discretionary. With Judicial Cognizance, the judge is BOUND to act:
See Black's Law, 6th Ed, pg 847


Judicial cognizance. Judicial notice or knowledge upon which a judge is
bound to act without having it proved in evidence.

Judicial notice. (pg. 849) The act by which a court, in conducting a trial,
or framing its decision, will, of its own motion or on request of a party,
and without the production of evidence, recognize the existence and truth of
certain facts, having a bearing on the controversy at bar, ....

============================================================================
TOPIC: Reasons to Vacate Void Judgments - Lack of Jurisdiction
=============================================================================

Reasons to Vacate Void Judgments - Lack of Jurisdiction

(http://www.amatterofjustice.org/amoj/ library/0008reas ons.htm)
(http://www.amattero fjustice. org/amoj/ cases/d046469. pdf)

January 2, 2004 Void Judgments Understanding Void Judgments

Definition of Void Judgment: any judgment which a court renders while lacking jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties. 

* Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz , 411, 300 P. 955(1931),
* Tube City Mining & Millng Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146p 203(1914); and
* Millken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S. CT. 339,85 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1940). 

Subject matter jurisdiction can never be presumed, waived, or constructed,
even by mutual consent of the parties, and it has two parts:

(1) the statutory or common law authority for the court to hear the case, and

(2) the appearance and testimony of a competent fact witness - in other
words, sufficiency of pleadings.

When we examine a judgment, the following indices tell us whether a court
had subject matter jurisdiction. Successful litigants will know each and
every one of them by heart. Subject matter jurisdiction usually fails
because of one of these reasons: 

(1) No petition in the record of the case, Brown v. VanKeuren,
340 Ill. 118,122 (1930).

(2) Defective petition filed, Same case as above.

(3) Fraud committed in the procurement of jurisdiction, Fredman
Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d
893(1985)

(4) Fraud upon the court, In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill,
App. 3d 393(1962)

(5) Judge does not follow statutory procedure, Armstrong v.
Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921)

(6) Unlawful activity of a judge, Code of Judicial Conduct.

(7) Violation of due process, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
58 S.Ct. 1019(193 ; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake , 10 Ill.2d 241, 245,
140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936), ( If
the court exceeded it's statutory authority. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278
F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)

(8) One or more actions violated 11 U.S.C. 362(a), in re
Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D> Illinois, 1989).

(9) No proper pleadings presented a justiciable issue to the
court, Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App 3d 701, 637 N.E. 2d 633 (1st Dist.
1994)

(10) A complaint states no cognizable cause of action against that
party, Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill App. 3d 441, 618 N.E. 2d 554 (1st. Dist.
1993)

(11) A person/law firm prohibited by law to practice law in that
jurisdiction represented a litigant before the court.

(12) The judge engaged in bribery (the Alemann cases, Bracey v
Warden , U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997)

(13) No one properly issued a summons.

(14) No one made service of process pursuant to statute and Supreme
Courth Rules, Janove v. Bacon, 6 Ill. 2d 245, 249, 218 N.E. 2d 706, 708
(1953)

(15) Someone did not comply with the rules of the Circuit court.

(16) Someone did not comply with the local rules of the special
court (one where the judge does not act impartially, Bracey v. Warden, U.S.
Supreme Court No. 96-6133(June 9, 1997)

(17) The statute is vague, People v. Williams, 638 N.E. 2d 207 (1st
Dist. (1994)

(18) The movant did not give proper notice to all parties, Wilson v.
Moore, 13 Ill. App. 3d 632, 301 N.E. 2d 39 (1st Dist. (1973)

(19) A judge based an order/judgment on a void order/judgment,
Austin v. Smith, 312 F 2d 337, 343(1962);English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d
736, 393 N.E. 2d 18 (1st Dist. 1979) or

(20) Someone violated the public policy of the State of Illinois,
Martin-Tregona v Roderick, 29 Ill. App. 3d 553, 331 N.E. 2d 100 (1st Dist.
1975)

(21) A judge does not validly hold office because of the absence of
or a defect in one or more of the following: 

a. qualification as a candidate (typically include American
citizenship, bar membership, registered voter status, a number of years of
service as an attorney, filing of a financial statement that shows
compliance with law, not serving in any other branch of government),

b. appointment or election to office (illegal campaign contributions or
other illegal financial entanglements can disqualify),

c. acceptance of appointment or elected position (some never bother to
accept the appointment or elected position),

d. one or more loyalty oaths associated with qualification and service
(a typical judge must swear the following loyalty oaths, evidenced by the
signature of a person duly authorized to take acknowledgements):

i. Elector's (voter registration) loyalty oath

ii. Bar member's oath

iii. Pre-appointment/election candidate's loyalty oath

iv. Candidate's oath

v. Public Officer's or Judge's loyalty oath

vi. Public employee's loyalty oath.

About Loyalty Oaths and Appointments

Many public employees have serious defects in their oath and appointment
documents, and many do not have those documents on record as required by
law. The wise litigant will obtain certified copies of all such documents
for all officers of the court (judges, clerk, prosecutors or opposing
counsel, and bailiffs), and move for the disqualification of any and all for
whom valid oath and appointment documents do not exist.

The judge validly holds office if and only if a copy of the judge's oath of
office exists, and you can rightly demand that the proper final oath sworn
or affirmed upon taking office situates in the judge's chambers. You can go
to his office and demand to see a copy of his oath of office at any time.

The federal laws covering judges and other public officials are to be found
at 5 U.S.C. 3331, 28 U.S.C. 543, and 5 U.S.C. 1983. States typically have
similar laws. A judge trespasses upon the court unless he complies with all
of the provisions of relevant law. Once a proven trespasser upon the court
(upon the law) not one of his judgments, pronouncements or orders have
validity. All constitute nullities and have void status.

Upon discovering such a trespass, you will face serious difficulty getting
the trespasser removed from office, and the fact that so many litigants give
up in the process explains why so many criminal trespassers still function
in public office.

============================================================================
TOPIC: Powe v. US: what does "citizen" mean?
============================================================================

Powe v. United States, 5 Cir., 1940, 109 F.2d 147, certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 679, 60 S.Ct. 717

I finally found it. It's quoted a bit different than the opinion quoted:

In Powe v. U.S. 109 F2d 147, 149 (1940) the court determined the term
`citizen,' when used in federal laws, excludes State citizens.

The court was specifically speaking about 18 U.S.C.A §51 in its
deleiniation of citizens, however, that does not mean it does not apply to
other stautory areas.

Interesting note: Appeals from the District Court of the United States

Proper quotes below:

"In its construction [18 U.S.C.A. § 51] it is proper to apply the rule that
criminal laws are to be construed strictly, and to bear in mind that other
rule that a construction is to be avoided, if possible, that would render
the law unconstitutional, or raise grave doubts thereabout. In view of these
rules it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and
not person generally, nor citizen of a State; and that the "rights and
privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" means
those specially and validly secured thereby. Thus limited, this section has
been enforced as constitutional. " POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1940)


OR


"In its construction [18 U.S.C.A. &Sect; 51] it is proper to apply the rule that
criminal laws are to be construed strictly, .... In view of these rules it
is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and not person
generally, nor citizen of a State; and that the "rights and privileges
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" means those
specially and validly secured thereby. Thus limited, this section has been
enforced as constitutional. " POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1940)


OR taken out of context (perhaps)


"... it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United States", and not
person generally, nor citizen of a State; ... POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940)

United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Reports

POWE v. UNITED STATES, 109 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1940)

POWE et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 9130.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 17, 1940.
Page 148 Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of Alabama; John McDuffie, Judge. Sam B. Powe and
others were convicted for conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and
intimidate a named citizen of the United States in the free exercise of his
right and privilege as such
citizen to speak and publish his views in certain newspapers, and they
appeal. Reversed and remanded with direction. Harry T. Smith, D.R.
Coley, Jr., and George A. Sossaman, all of Mobile, Ala., for appellants.
Francis H. Inge, U.S. Atty., of Mobile, Ala., for appellee. Before
SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges. SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
The five appellants were indicted (with another who was acquitted) for
conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate a named citizen of
the United States in the free exercise of his right and privilege as such
citizen to speak and publish his views in certain newspapers. Their several
demurrers were overruled and appellants Page 149 were convicted and
sentenced. Of the numerous rulings
asserted to be error on this appeal we need consider only the judgment
upon the demurrers. The grounds of demurrer to each count include
these: That no crime against the United States is charged; that the right
of free speech and free press is not secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States against infraction by individuals, but only by federal
or State action; and that the counts are too vague. The eight counts are
varying statements of the same conspiracy. Some of them say the conspiracy
was to prevent future publications; others to oppress and injure because of
past publications. Some counts state the nature of the publications, and
the means to be used to oppress the writer; others fail so to state, baldly
alleging in the words of the statute a conspiracy to injure and oppress the
citizen of the United States in the exercise of or for having exercised his
privilege of free speech and free press. One of the fullest statements is the
second count, which charges that the conspiracy was to injure and oppress
the executive editor of the Mobile Register and the Mobile Press,
newspapers published in Mobile, Alabama, he being a citizen of the United
States, in his exercise of his right and privilege secured to him by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, to write and print in said
newspapers his editorials exposing and condemning various forms of illegal
gambling and illegal lotteries in Mobile County, Alabama, and calling upon
the officials of the City of Mobile and County of Mobile, charged with the
suppression thereof, to take action to suppress the same and to punish the
offenders; the plan being to procure a photograph of the editor in a lewd
or obscene act and to use the same in threatening to show the photograph,
and in threatening
to use it as evidence in prosecuting the editor, and thus to stop his
publications; numerous overt acts to carry out the plan being alleged. Do
these facts make an offense against the United States? The statute
relied on in support of the indictment originated as Section 6 of the Act
of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 141 , entitled "An Act of enforce the Right of
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union,
and for other Purposes." It appeared in the Revised Statutes with some
alteration as Section 5508; was carried without change into the Criminal
Code as Section 19; and now appears as Section 51 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 51. The applicable language is: "If two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same * * * they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not
more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any
office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or
laws of the United States." Some of the Sections of the Enforcement Act of
1870 were repealed in 1909, but Section 6, as then reenacted, stands good
for whatever it properly covers. United States v. Moseley, 238 U.S. 383, 35
S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355. In its construction it is proper to apply the
rule that criminal laws are to be construed strictly, and to bear in mind
that other rule that a construction is to be avoided, if possible, that
would render the law unconstitutional, or raise grave doubts thereabout. In
view of these rules it is held that "citizen" means "citizen of the United
States", and not person generally, nor citizen of a
State; and that the "rights and privileges secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States" means those specially and validly secured
thereby. Thus limited, this section has been enforced as constitutional. Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; United States v.
Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 S.Ct. 35, 28 L.Ed. 673; Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429; United States v. Moseley, supra. In
the Yarbrough case the right involved was that to vote in a Congressional
election, as it was in the Moseley case; in the Waddell case it was the
right to make a federal homestead entry; and in the Logan case it was the
right to be secure from
lawless violence while a prisoner in the hands of a United States Marshal.
These matters, all within the federal power, Congress could protect under
the general authority to pass "all necessary and proper laws", under
U.S.C.A. Constitution, Art. 1, Sect. 8, Par. 18. But Section 5519 of the
Revised Statutes, which undertook similarly to punish conspiracies against
any person to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, or Page 150
to prevent State authorities from affording such protection, was held
unconstitutional, because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
part of the Constitution put the matter of conspiracies by individuals
touching such matters within the power of Congress, but only gave power to
correct wrong action by the State or its officers. It was so held in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290, where the person
mobbed was in the custody of a State Sheriff; and in Baldwin v. Franks, 120
U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656, 763, 30 L.Ed. 766, where the rights of a Chinese
under a treaty of the United States were involved. It was again held that
the power of Congress was not extended to protect against violations by
individuals of the general rights of persons and citizens by the mention of
such rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A., in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. The reasoning of these cases,
though opposed by some dissents, is full and convincing, and the conclusion
reached as to the effect upon federal power of the Fourteenth Amendment has
stood for more than two generations. Pursuing further the application
of the statute now
before us, in Baldwin v. Franks, supra, it was held the word "citizen"
means citizen of the United States in a political sense, and did not
include a resident Chinese. Again in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,
27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65, the section was invoked against conspirators who
were charged with interfering with citizens in their right or liberty of
contracting to work in a lawful occupation, but the court held that this
was a common right of all persons, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not put
it under federal protection except against State action; and the fact that
the persons there involved were negroes did not bring the matter within the
special ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment. Similarly in United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65 L.Ed. 270,
the right invaded by the conspirators was the citizen's right to remain in
the State of his choice, and to remove only at his own will. The Court
conceded the right to be fundamental and to belong to the citizens of each
State, and to be guarded in part against State interference by Art. 4,
Sect. 2 of the Constitution, but held that no federal offense was involved
in an abduction done by individual conspirators. The only case cited to us
in which a conspiracy against the right of freedom of speech was involved
is United States v. Hall, in the Circuit Court of Alabama, 26 Fed.Cas. 79,
No. 15,282. Justice Woods there upheld the indictment, but this was in
1871, before the decision of any of the above cited cases in the Supreme
Court, and it is not reconcilable with his own opinion in United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290. We are
controlled by the above cited decisions of the Supreme Court. That the
right of free speech and a free press, understood with the limitations to
prevent abuses which the law has always annexed to these freedoms, is
fundamental to the continuance of free political institutions, and is the
right both of citizens and other persons in the United States and the
several States needs no reassertion. The ground has been covered recently
and the right vindicated as against State action by federal power by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, in such cases as Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
57 S.Ct. 732, 81
L.Ed. 1066; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949;
Schneider v. State of New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 60 S.Ct. 146, 84
L.Ed. ___; Frank Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.
496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423. But this effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on State action, as has been shown, is not enough to bring
conspiracies of individuals within the punitive power of Congress under the
section we are discussing. Nor can the special mention of freedom of speech
and press in the First Amendment have that effect. The provision there is
"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." That the first ten amendments were intended as limitations on the
power of the federal government and are not grants of power to it has been
established from the beginning. A flat prohibition against the regulation
of a matter in one direction cannot result in endowing Congress with power
to regulate it in another direction. This amendment, while regarding
freedom in religion, in speaking and printing, and in assembling and
petitioning the government for redress of Page 151 grievances as
fundamental and precious to all, seeks only to forbid that Congress should
meddle therein. If Congress can make any law in behalf of these it is
because of some power elsewhere expressly granted, or because it is a law
necessary and proper to carry out such power. We are familiar with federal
laws touching on freedom of speech and press such as the Espionage Law of
1917, 40 Stats. 217 , which rested on the war power of Congress and the
general implied power to maintain the safety of
the Government. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249,
63 L.Ed. 561; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed.
470. And we do not doubt that Congress may directly protect its citizens in
their right to assemble peaceably and petition the federal government for
redress, just as it may protect persons from unlawful violence while in
federal custody, under what are called the implied powers of Congress.
Federal elections might probably be directly protected by Congress
although no question of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
under the Fifteenth Amendment be present. But in the cases supposed
Congress would interfere directly only because of the necessity to maintain
a federal right in its integrity. Because the federal
government is a republican one in which the will of the people ought to
prevail, and because that will ought to be expressive of an informed public
opinion, the freedom of speaking and printing on subjects relating to that
government, its elections, its laws, its operations and its officers is
vital to it. Assuming that for this reason Congress, if it finds it
necessary, can legislate to maintain such freedom in that field, it does
not follow that Congress can legislate generally to preserve such freedom
in discussing religious affairs, or social or artistic matters, or matters
of purely State concern. Again, by Art. 4, Sect. 4, of the Constitution the
United States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of
government. Should a tyranny be set up in a State accompanied by a
suppression of free speech and press, conceivably the Congress might be
called on, temporarily in the execution of this guaranty, to pass a law
securing against individual
violence free speech in such State; but the section before us is not such
a law. The dividing line between the powers of the State and federal
governments in preserving these great general rights of persons, and the
difference between the rights and privileges of a citizen of the State and
of the United States, was clearly recognized in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552, 23 L.Ed. 588, when the section under
discussion first came before the Supreme Court. It was there stated that
the right of assembly to petition Congress would be "an attribute of
national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed
by, the United States", and "if it had been alleged * * * that the object
of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case
would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the
United States." But since the indictment only alleged generally that the
meeting was "for a lawful purpose", no crime was charged, because the
protection of the right of assembly in general was in the power of the
State. The other counts alleged conspiracies generally to deprive of the
equal protection of the law, and of life and liberty without due process
of law, and the Fourteenth Amendment was held not to extend federal power
as to those matters beyond the controlling of State action. On the
authority of the Cruikshank case the counts in the present indictment,
which do not disclose what the speaking and printing conspired against
related to, charge no offense, because the right to freely speak and print
about matters in general is not "secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States." The other counts which state the speaking and printing
related wholly to matters with which the City and County of Mobile were
concerned, and with which the
United States had no concern, expressly disclose the matter to have been
beyond the authority of Congress, and not a right or privilege protected
by the section. The demurrers to the indictment ought therefore to have
been sustained. The judgment is reversed, the conviction set aside, and the
cause remanded with direction to sustain the demurrers. Page 152 Page 178

A special thanks to Bob Hurt of the (Lawmen group) for compiling above information.

Truly, sincerely, and without prejudice,
Bob Hurt, All Rights Reserved
2460 Persian Drive #70 * Clearwater, Florida 33763 * USA
+1 (727) 669-5511 * bob@bobhurt.com
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2010 Lawsuit filed Pro Se Against the State of South Carolina

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