Blog Author Specifically Invokes the First Amendment.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Obsidian Finance Group V Crystal Cox Tidbits. This email that Judge Marco Hernandez claimed as a reason I had no Journalistic Standards, and therefore the law and constitution does not apply to me, had nothing to do with the blog post I was on trial for. In Fact it had not even been sent when the Alleged Defamatory Posts were Posted.

"A federal judge denied a motion for retrial in the case of a self-described investigative blogger, ruling that private figure plaintiffs do not have to establish “negligence” or “actual malice” to hold a non-media defendant liable in a defamation suit arising out of speech not on a matter of public concern.

Judge Marco A. Hernandez clarified several issues in the defamation case against blogger Crystal Cox in his March 27 opinion, including why Cox was not provided heightened protection under the First Amendment.
In a motion for retrial, Cox’s lawyers, Eugene Volokh and Benjamin Souede, took the position that the judge erred in its instructions to the jurors. They argued that the court could hold the defendant liable only if the plaintiff proved negligence or “actual malice,” in accordance with the United States Supreme Court case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Hernandez, however, rejected this argument.
“In the end, the Supreme Court, in my opinion, has not squarely held that a private figure plaintiff who sues a non-media defendant regarding allegedly defamatory statements made on a private issue, is required to demonstrate negligence to establish liability,” Hernandez wrote.
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC and its co-founder Kevin D. Padrick sued Cox in January 2011 for defamation over posts she made to a website called obsidianfinancesucks.com. Hernandez threw out most of the claims in August, but found one, which was posted to another Cox-run site called bankruptcycorruption.com, was not protected. Cox was ordered to pay $2.5 million in damages to Obsidian and Padrick in November.
Cox did not present any evidence, Hernandez said in November, that she qualified as a member of the media, according to seven listed criteria, including: journalism education; media credentials at a “recognized news entity;” editing, fact-checking or disclosure of conflicts of interest or journalistic standards; notes of interviews; confidentiality agreements with sources; independent reporting; and balanced reporting.
Cox's attorneys argued that under Supreme Court precedent, the First Amendment "applies equally to the institutional press and to others who speak to the public." Because Gertz requires a showing of at least negligence in order to find a media defendant liable for defamation, Cox was entitled to the same protection, they argued.
But under Hernandez's analysis, because Cox did not qualify as a member of the media, her speech was not on a matter of public concern, and because the plaintiffs were private figures, she was not entitled to heightened protection under the First Amendment.
In his most recent opinion, Hernandez rejected Cox’s argument that “a higher standard of fault was required,” ruling the previously given jury instruction -- that the “[d]efendant’s knowledge of whether the statements at issue were true or false, and defendant's intent or purpose in publishing those statements, are not elements of the claim and are not relevant to a determination of liability" -- was correct.
“In my discussion, I did not state that a person who ‘blogs’ could never be considered ‘media,’” he wrote. “I also did not state that to be considered ‘media,’ one had to possess all or most of the characteristics I recited. Rather, I confined my conclusion to the record defendant created in this case and noted that defendant had presented no evidence as to any single one of the characteristics which would tend to establish oneself as a member of the ‘media.’”
The judge also referred to email sent by Cox to the plaintiffs, offering services for reputation repair for $2,500 per month, which he said, along with not providing evidence according to the criteria listed in November, led him to conclude she was not a member of the media.
Volokh, an attorney for Cox and professor at the University of California-Los Angeles law school, said that the judge’s ruling in the case could affect online and traditional media.
“Our position is it doesn’t matter who qualifies as a journalist, freedom of the press includes public access to the materials of the press, including printing and publishing,” he said. “Under the judge’s decision, if it stands, newspapers have First Amendment protections, and no one else does.”
Volokh, who operates his own blog called “The Volokh Conspiracy,” said experts in fields such as law, public policy, science and history are contributing to public debate through online platforms in the same manner as journalists, often providing more in-depth analyses.
“Look at the wide range of things that are on the web,” Volokh said. “The web includes things written by professional reporters and also field experts. We have people who, in the words of the judge, are not journalistically trained; who do not write for a recognized news entity; who do not necessarily hold ourselves to journalistic standards, but do hold ourselves to standards … Do we participate in the public debate? Yes, of course.”
Steven M. Wilker, an attorney for Obsidian Finance Group who specializes in media law among other things, said he does not think the case will affect the way libel cases are handled for reporters, because Cox is not a reporter. He said Cox has filed an appeal of the judge’s decision.
“I don’t think we have had the last word yet on this case,” he said.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which filed a friend-of-the-court brief in support of Cox, raised other issues including Oregon's retraction and reporter's shield statutes. The court held that neither of these statutes applied to the blog posts at issue in the case."
Keep in Mind Folks the Judge Saying "The judge also referred to email sent by Cox to the plaintiffs, offering services for reputation repair for $2,500 per month," As a Reason I am not protected by the First Amendment, is FALSE, Misleading, Unlawful and Unconstitutional. 
Judge Marco Hernandez was Supposed to be lawfully RULING regarding a Blog Post of December 25th 2010. 
Instead he BASED his RULING on one eMail out of 5 eMails between Pro Se Defendant Crystal Cox, acting in her pro se capacity, and David S. Aman, Opposing Council, SENT on January 19th 2011,  which was a month after the Blog Post I was on Trial for.
And AFTER  / in response to a Lawsuit filed by David S. Aman of Tonkon Torp Law Firm on behalf of Obsidian Finance Group filed on January 14th 2011 against Crystal Cox.  Also keep in mind this one of 5 emails was SENT after / in response to a cease and desist, threat of a Lawsuit sent on December 22nd 2011, as the records show, it was a REPLY to this eMail as the Records show. And in Response to a 10 Million Dollar Lawsuit filed against me, Crystal Cox, as a way to offer a Settlement, a Negotiation to try and stop a lawsuit, not to Extort Anyway, as I had been reporting on the Summit Bankruptcy for 3 years. 
This email that Judge Marco Hernandez claimed as a reason I had no Journalistic Standards, and therefore the law and constitution does not apply to me, had nothing to do with the blog post I was on trial for. In Fact it had not even been sent when the Alleged Defamatory Posts were Posted. 
When I posted the alleged Defamatory Post I had not yet sent that eMail that Judge Marco Hernandez claimed was a reason to deny me a fair, lawful constitutional ruling. 
Judge Marco Hernandez's RULINGS were to protect Elite Law Firms, Judge Michael Simon, Judge Randall Dunn, Large Utility Companies and Privileged Lawyers in Portland Oregon and were NOT based in the laws of the United States nor the Constitution. 

"New Jersey Supreme Court limits libel damages, distinguishes online speech"

"The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that a defamation suit over online accusations of child sexual abuse could still proceed, even though the plaintiff could not show he was harmed.
The decision upheld a 2010 appeals court ruling that New Jersey First Amendment attorneys hoped would lead to a change in the law by the state's Supreme Court.
Although the attorneys called for the end of the legal doctrine that permits defamation suits where no harm can be shown, known as presumed damages, the court only partially agreed with them. Instead, it limited the scope of presumed damages, but said the doctrine would continue in New Jersey.
In fact, the court said this policy may be even more appropriate in the age of the Internet. As in the recent, similar Crystal Cox blogger case in Oregon, the court appeared to treat online speech as a special concern.
"[F]or a private person defamed through the modern means of the Internet, proof of...damages respecting loss of reputation can be difficult if not well-nigh insurmountable," the court said.
In the case, the plaintiff - referred to as D.A. in court records - brought a defamation complaint against his nephew, W.J.A., in response to W.J.A.'s website accusations that his uncle sexually abused him as a child. W.J.A. lost a 1998 suit against his uncle for child molestation and he was also hit with a $50,000 defamation judgment.
W.J.A. then moved to Florida and continued to post the same accusations against his uncle online while denying the validity of the judgment against him, which W.J.A. refused to pay.
The court found W.J.A's statements were less protected because they found they concerned a private subject. New Jersey has ruled that presumed damages are not available for speech about public figures or matters of public concern. But now the court has said that presumed damages will still be available for lawsuits that involve private speech."

"Judge dismisses ex-congressman’s defamation lawsuit against writer"

"A federal judge has dismissed former U.S. Rep. Gary Condit's defamation lawsuit against Vanity Fair writer Dominick Dunne, who commented on CNN that he thought Condit knew more about a murdered D.C. intern than he had revealed.

U.S. District Judge Peter Leisure wrote in his opinion that the First Amendment and California law protected Dunne's comments.

"Dunne's opinion statements do not, either in substance or in implication, constitute provably false assertions of fact," Leisure wrote in dismissing the case, adding that "Dunne does not suggest that his opinion statements are based on any additional facts not known to the public."

Source and Full Article
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/judge-dismisses-ex-congressman%E2%80%99s-defamation-lawsuit-against-writer

"The bottom line is it’s now not as easy for plaintiffs to recover in libel cases because of that threshold definition of libel."

" the New Mexico Supreme Court unanimously reversed this decision.

Clarifying the state's defamation law, the court concluded that one must lay out all elements of a defamation case – including evidence that communications damaged his or her reputation – before liability for defamation can be determined and damages awarded. The court found that the district court ruled correctly because Smith was never suspended or let go from his position at the church and did not demonstrate actual injury, the high court's opinion said.

"It’s a real advance for the news media to have this definition of the libel set out so clearly in this New Mexico Supreme Court case," Simmons said. "The bottom line is it’s now not as easy for plaintiffs to recover in libel cases because of that threshold definition of libel."

Source and Full Article
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/nm-high-court-dismisses-priests-defamation-lawsuit

" Recent Developments in the Enforceability of Website Terms of Use Agreements March 29, 2012 The British Columbia Supreme Court recently considered a claim for breach of contract arising from a terms of use agreement contained on a website in Century 21 Canada Ltd. Partnership v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2011 BCSC 1196. The central issue was whether the terms of use gave rise to a binding contract between the owner of the website and its user in the absence of an affirmative act on the part of the user expressing assent to the terms. The case challenged the Court to consider the evolving nature of “offer” and “acceptance” in the new context of internet contracting. In a precedent-setting decision, the Court held that the act of accessing a website containing terms of use may give rise to an enforceable contract. The decision has significant implications for internet users and businesses that engage in internet commerce. This article discusses the decision’s background, reasoning, and implications. Read the full article here: Matthew Nied, “I Browse Therefore I Accept: Recent Developments in the Enforceability of Website Terms of Use Agreements” (2012) 1:1 Commercial Litigation and Arbitration Review 11. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in uncategorized Tags: "2011 BCSC 1196", "browse-wrap agreements", "Century 21 Canada Ltd. Partnership v. Rogers Communications Inc.", "contract law", internet Leave a Comment » Preventing Spoliation of Social Networking Profile Evidence in Insurance Litigation November 22, 2011 Recent years have witnessed the phenomenal growth of social networking websites, such as Facebook and MySpace. Social networking websites are now commonly used by individuals to communicate information about their personal life to other members of their network. As a result, they have become an integral part of the disclosure process in insurance litigation where plaintiffs put their enjoyment of life, psychological well-being, or ability to work in issue. In these cases, photographs or other materials on a plaintiff’s social networking profile may be relevant to demonstrating their ability to engage in work or recreational activities. For these reasons, courts now routinely admit profile material as evidence in insurance litigation. Few disclosure issues will arise when a plaintiff’s profile is publicly accessible because insurers will have access to any relevant material. However, not all material is publicly accessible. Many users now have “access-limited” profiles which permit them to limit access to designated persons. Accordingly, a user’s profile will often have a public space and a private space. Because material on a profile’s private space will generally not be accessible to insurers, it will often be impossible for insurers to determine whether it contains relevant material. Where an insurer has reason to believe that a plaintiff has not complied with their disclosure obligation, they may move for relief before the courts. Unfortunately, recent cases demonstrate that some plaintiffs, if alerted of an insurer’s attempts to seek production of access-limited profile evidence, will frustrate those attempts by deleting material harmful to their claims. Some insurers have attempted to reduce this risk by seeking ex parte orders to compel plaintiffs to preserve the contents of their access-limited profiles. Preservation orders are remedies sought to ensure that evidence is preserved and available for the trial of an action where there is a significant likelihood that a party will destroy it once notified of the other’s interest in accessing it. This article discusses the risk of spoliation of social networking profile evidence, considers cases in which insurers have sought ex parte preservation orders to alleviate that risk, and discusses potential alternatives. … Read the full article here: Matthew Nied, “Preventing Spoliation of Social Networking Profile Evidence in Insurance Litigation” (2011) 29:6 Canadian Journal of Insurance Law 81. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in uncategorized Leave a Comment » Crookes v. Newton: Hyperlinking, Defamation Law, and Freedom of Expression on the Internet October 24, 2011 Last week, the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Crookes v. Newton, 2011 SCC 47, affirming 2009 BCCA 392 and 2008 BCSC 1424. At issue was whether creating an internet hyperlink to defamatory material constitutes “publication” of the material for the purposes of defamation law. The case challenged the Court to strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation in the new context of internet communications. To succeed in a defamation action, a plaintiff must first prove that defamatory words were published. The decision in Crookes stands for the proposition that a hyperlink, by itself, is not publication of the content to which it refers. Publication will only occur if the hyperlink is presented in a way that repeats the defamatory content. This article discusses the decision’s background, reasoning, and implications. Background The appellant brought numerous defamation actions against various individuals and organizations alleging that he had been defamed in several articles on the internet. After those actions were commenced, the respondent posted an article on his website which commented on the implications of the plaintiff’s defamation suits for operators of internet forums. The respondent’s article included hyperlinks to websites containing some of the allegedly defamatory articles that were the subject of the plaintiff’s actions. However, the respondent’s article did not reproduce or comment on the content in those articles. The appellant discovered the respondent’s article and advised him to remove the hyperlinks. When the respondent refused, the appellant brought an action seeking damages for defamation on the basis that the hyperlinks constituted publication of the allegedly defamatory articles. There was evidence that the respondent’s article had been viewed 1,788 times, but no evidence as to how many times, if any, the hyperlinks in the article had been followed. Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada The issue on appeal was whether creating a hyperlink to allegedly defamatory material constitutes publication of that material. The reasons of the six-justice majority, penned by Abella J., began by describing the evolution of the “publication rule.” Under this rule, any act which had the effect of communicating defamatory words to a third person constituted publication. The breadth of activity caught by the publication rule over the years has been vast. For example, a person whose role was to manually operate a printing press was, in one older case, found liable for defamatory words contained in the publication, despite being unaware of its contents. The majority observed that the harshness of the publication rule was later alleviated by the development of the “innocent dissemination” defence, which protects defendants that play a role in the distribution of potentially defamatory material. Defendants, such as booksellers and libraries, may avoid liability if they had no actual knowledge of alleged libel, were not aware of circumstances that would give cause to suspect a libel, and were not negligent in failing to discover the libel. The majority also recognized that, in recent years, the application of the publication rule has been tempered by cases which suggest that some acts of communication are so passive that they should not be considered publication. For example, the majority referred to English cases in which internet service providers and search engines were not held liable as publishers because they only played a passive instrumental role, and acted without knowledge, in the process of publishing the defamatory words. In other cases referred to by the majority, courts had held that merely making a reference to defamatory material was not publication. In light of these developments, the majority concluded that creating a hyperlink to defamatory material is not the type of act that constitutes publication. In the majority’s view, modern realities made it necessary to interpret the publication rule to exclude references, such as hyperlinks, in order to accord with Charter values, recent jurisprudence, and the evolution of communications technology. In declining to expose hyperlinks to the wide breadth of the traditional publication rule, the majority reasoned that hyperlinks are essentially content neutral references to material that hyperlinkers have not created and do not control. Although a hyperlink communicates that information exists and may facilitate the transfer of information, it does not, by itself, communicate information. It is also significant that the majority’s reasons focused on the important role of the internet in promoting freedom of expression, and the importance of hyperlinks in facilitating access to information on the internet. As Abella J. writes, [36] The Internet cannot, in short, provide access to information without hyperlinks. Limiting their usefulness by subjecting them to the traditional publication rule would have the effect of seriously restricting the flow of information and, as a result, freedom of expression. The potential “chill” in how the Internet functions could be devastating, since primary article authors would unlikely want to risk liability for linking to another article over whose changeable content they have no control. Given the core significance of the role of hyperlinking to the Internet, we risk impairing its whole functioning. Strict application of the publication rule in these circumstances would be like trying to fit a square archaic peg into the hexagonal hole of modernity. However, the majority also recognized that a hyperlink will constitute publication if it “presents content from the hyperlinked material in a way that actually repeats the defamatory content.” This might occur, for example, where a person inserts a hyperlink in text that repeats the defamatory content in the hyperlinked material. In these cases, the hyperlink would be more than a reference; it would be an expression of defamatory meaning. This had not occurred in the case at bar, so the majority dismissed the appeal. McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. substantially agreed with the majority, but held that “a hyperlink should constitute publication if, read contextually, the text that includes the hyperlink constitutes adoption or endorsement of the specific content it links to.” In their view, a hyperlinker should be liable for linked defamatory content if the surrounding context communicates agreement with the linked content. In these cases, the hyperlink “ceases to be a mere reference and the content to which it refers becomes part of the published text itself.” Deschamps J. agreed with the result, but disagreed with the approaches taken by the other justices. In her view, the blanket exclusion of all references from the scope of the publication rule erroneously treats all references alike. According to Deschamps J.’s reasons, the majority’s approach “disregards the fact that references vary greatly in how they make defamatory information available to readers and, consequently, in the harm they cause to reputations.” To address this concern, Deschamps J. proposed a nuanced and highly fact-driven framework under which a hyperlink would constitute publication if the plaintiff established two elements: that the defendant “performed a deliberate act that made defamatory material readily available to a third party in a comprehensible form,” and that “a third party received and understood the defamatory [material].” To establish the first element under Deschamps J.’s approach, plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the defendant played more than a passive instrumental role in making the information available, and make reference to numerous factors bearing on the ease with which the referenced information could be accessed. To establish the second element, plaintiffs would need to adduce direct evidence that a third party had received and understood the defamatory material, or convince the court to draw an inference to that effect based on the totality of the circumstances. Implications Crookes presented the Court with a welcome opportunity to consider the proper balance between the competing interests of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation in the context of internet communications. Five years ago, defamation law leaned significantly towards protecting reputation. Today, as a result of Crookes and other landmark cases – such as WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, and Grant v. Torstar, 2009 SCC 61 – defamation law better protects and promotes the fundamental right to freedom of expression. However, the decision in Crookes could have undesirable consequences in certain circumstances. As the Court recognized, the internet’s borderless and far-reaching mode of publication has tremendous power to harm reputation. As a result of Crookes, a victim of internet defamation who wishes to vindicate their reputation and prevent the spread of defamatory material only has a remedy against the person who created and controls the material – not persons who have referred their readers to it. It is surprising that in the majority’s view this approach creates “little or no limitation to a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his or her reputation.” Yet, in some cases, the majority’s approach may create opportunity for abuse that significantly limits a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate their reputation. The creation of a hyperlink is a means by which defamatory material can be rapidly disseminated. Defamatory material contained on an obscure website may, for example, receive the attention of a vast number of readers if a popular blogger hyperlinks to it. In these circumstances, the plaintiff would have no action against the hyperlinker, even if they created the hyperlink with the malicious intent of spreading the defamatory words. Such a situation would be especially troubling if the victim were also unable to pursue a remedy against the creator of the defamatory material because they published the material anonymously – a common occurrence on the internet. In addition, if the defamatory material were posted on a third party’s website operated in the United States, and that website passively hosted the material, legislation would apply to immunize the operator of the website from liability: see Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996); see also Crookes at para. 28. If the operator of the website refused to remove the defamatory material, it would remain visible for the world to see. The victim would be left without any remedy and, meanwhile, the use of hyperlinks could cause the defamatory material to rise from obscurity to notoriety. Although this concern might be alleviated by adopting the more contextual and nuanced approaches suggested by McLachlin C.J. and Fish J., and Deschamps J., those approaches lack the welcome certainty of the majority’s bright-line rule. McLachlin C.J. and Fish J.’s test for publication is dependent on the presence of indicia of “adoption or endorsement,” the scope of which is inherently uncertain. Deschamps J.’s approach is similarly fact-driven. If either test applied, it would be difficult to predict in advance whether a hyperlink constituted publication. Uncertain exposure to liability might then deter the public from using hyperlinks, which could inhibit the internet as a medium for free expression. This very concern likely drove the majority to establish its bright-line rule. The non-majority approaches would also have the undesirable effect of shifting the weight of litigation to defendants. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of defamation, the onus shifts to the defendant to raise any available defences. Both of the non-majority approaches would lower the threshold to be met by plaintiffs in order to establish a prima facie case. As a result, more internet users would be thrown into the costly position of having to justify their conduct by reaching for the protection of a defence. Although the wide availability of defences for hyperlinkers may, as Deschamps J. suggests, “dissuade overeager litigants from having a chilling effect on hyperlinking,” it would not deter plaintiffs who wish to stifle criticism by intimidating defendants through costly litigation. Lastly, it is important to recognize that the decision in Crookes may not be the final word on defamation liability for hyperlinks. The Court expressly left open the question of whether the same principles apply to embedded or automatic hyperlinks, which automatically display referenced material with little or no prompting from the reader. These hyperlinks are distinguishable from the user-activated hyperlinks in Crookes, which require users to click on the hyperlink in order to access content. Although the Court declined to comment on the legal implications of automatic or embedded hyperlinks, it appears that they would constitute publication, according to the majority’s reasoning, to the extent that they make third party content appear as part of the website that the hyperlinker controls. This article was originally posted at The Court (Osgoode Hall Law School), and is reproduced here with permission. This article was also referred to on the Heenan Blaikie LLP Entertainment and Media Law Signal. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in uncategorized 1 Comment » The Internet, Cloud Computing, and the Charter Right to Privacy: The Effect of Terms of Service Agreements on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy September 30, 2011 The use of the internet as a tool in the commission of crime has given rise to new search and seizure issues. When individuals use the internet, their personal information may be transmitted to various online service providers, such as social networking websites, email service providers, and internet service providers. In many cases, online service providers impose terms of service agreements on their users which require them to agree to the disclosure of their personal information to the authorities for the purpose of criminal investigations. Recent decisions indicate that such terms of service agreements are a key factor in assessing the legality of warrantless disclosure in the internet context under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These decisions may contribute to an erosion of privacy rights as the internet becomes increasingly central to daily life. Individuals use the internet to perform a variety of personal activities, including writing and receiving correspondence, storing personal files, and developing social networks. However, in order to use these increasingly vital services, individuals must trust their information to online service providers. In doing so, users often unknowingly subject themselves to non-negotiated terms of service agreements that may limit their privacy expectations. As computing trends fuel a migration of information from personal computers to remote servers controlled by online service providers, more of the public’s information may become exposed to warrantless seizure by the state. This article surveys the law, discusses the effect of terms of service agreements, and considers the privacy implications. … Read the full article here. It was published in: Matthew Nied, “The Internet, Cloud Computing, and the Charter Right to Privacy: The Effect of Terms of Service Agreements on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” (2011) 69:5 The Advocate (Magazine of the Vancouver Bar Association) 701. Also published in (2011) 12:5 Internet and E-Commerce Law in Canada 40. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in Canadian law, criminal law, privacy, technology Tags: Charter of Rights and Freedoms, criminal law, internet, PIPEDA, privacy, R v. Ballendine (2011 BCCA 221), R. v. Brousseau (2010 ONSC 6753), R. v. Cuttell (2009 ONCJ 471), R. v. Friers (2008 ONCJ 740), R. v. Gomboc (2009 ABCA 276), R. v. Gomboc (2010 SCC 55), R. v. Kwok ([2008] O.J. No. 2414), R. v. McNeice (2010 BCSC 1544), R. v. Spencer (2009 SKQB 341), R. v. Trapp (2009 SKPC 5), R. v. Vasic ([2009] O.J. No. 685), R. v. Verge ([2009] O.J. No. 6300), R. v. Wilson ([2009] O.J. No. 1067) 1 Comment » Baglow v. Smith: Removing the Defamatory Sting From Online Debates on Blogs and Message Boards September 1, 2011 Earlier this week, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice released its decision in Baglow v. Smith, 2011 ONSC 5131. The decision suggests that an allegedly defamatory statement made in a debate on blogs or internet forums may not be found to be defamatory if the plaintiff previously engaged in the debate but did not respond to the statement despite having the opportunity to do so. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants defamed him by making statements that exceeded the boundaries of their normally acrimonious political debate on the internet. In particular, the plaintiff complained that the defendants defamed him by branding him “one of the Taliban’s more vocal supporters” on an internet message board. The words complained of referred back to an ongoing discussion, largely on the plaintiff’s blog, where the parties had debated the validity of the trial of Omar Khadr. The parties had aggressively berated each other, and often employed colourful derogatory characterizations. Although the plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to the impugned statements on the internet message board, he did not do so. The defendants brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the statements were not defamatory or, alternatively, that the defence of fair comment applied. Mr. Justice Annis concluded that the impugned statements were not defamatory and granted summary judgment dismissing the action. Significantly, the Court proceeded to remark in obiter that the conclusion that the statements were not defamatory was supported by the fact that the statements were made “in the context of an ongoing blogging thread over the Internet” that provided each party with the opportunity to “respond to disparaging comments before the same audience in an immediate or relatively contemporaneous time frame.” According to the Court, “a statement is not derogatory when made in a context that provides an opportunity to challenge the comment and the rules of the debate anticipate a rejoinder, unless the statement is wholly outside the scope of the debate or otherwise so outrageous as to prevent meaningful argument from continuing.” In the Court’s view, the fact that the statements were made in the context of an internet debate forum was a contextual factor to consider in determining whether the statements were defamatory: [58] Although I am satisfied that the words complained [of] are not capable of damaging the reputation of the plaintiff, I am of the view that there is another contextual factor that would further bolster this conclusion, namely that the alleged defamatory words were made in the context of an ongoing blogging thread over the Internet. [59] Internet blogging is a form of public conversation. By the back and forth character it provides an opportunity for each party to respond to disparaging comments before the same audience in an immediate or a relatively contemporaneous time frame. [60] This distinguishes the context of blogging from other forms of publication of defamatory statements. One exception could be the live debate, of which blogging constitutes the modern written form. [61] I am not suggesting that defamation can never occur in a live debate. I do say however, that the live debate forum should be considered as a contextual factor to determine whether the statement is defamatory in so far as whether it is complete. The Court suggested that the defamatory sting arising from statements made on the internet may be substantially reduced or eliminated by responding to the statements: [62] An example that does not in any manner reflect the Court’s views on these issues, but which might serve to explain how derogatory, even defamatory remarks are expected to be parried in a live debate so as to remove the “sting of the libel” and attenuate any threats of diminution of reputation might be as follows: [The defendant] knows full well that I abhor what the Taliban stand for. His calling me one of their supporters because I think they should be entitled to due process in accordance with International law would be like me calling him (some derogatory descriptor, e.g. “a Nazi fascist”) because he wants to trample the rights that Canadians cherish, etc. [Example provided by the Court] [63] Given that the plaintiff pleads his belief that “there is a reasonable likelihood of damage to my reputation if it became generally believed that I supported the enemies of the Canadian Forces”, it seems that the tendency of the comment to lower his reputation, particularly when arising in the form of a comment in a debate, could have been quickly nipped in the bud by a simple rejoinder in the fashion described above. This would have had the additional benefit of allowing him to score some points of his own. The Court’s comments were based on the principle that a statement is defamatory if it tends to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers by lowering him or her in the estimation of right-thinking members of society: Baglow, at para. 11. Accordingly, the issue of whether the statements on the blog were defamatory was to be judged through the eyes of its readers: [64] More importantly to the issue of context, the blogging audience is expecting and would indeed want to hear a rejoinder of this nature where the parry and thrust of the debaters is appreciated as much as the substance of what they say. [65] In essence, I am suggesting that the Court, in construing alleged defamatory words in an ongoing debate, should determine whether the context of the comment from the perspective of the reasonable reader or listener is one that anticipates a rejoinder, which would eliminate the possible consequence of a statement lowering the reputation of the plaintiff in their eyes. [66] To some extent the Court is attempting to decide whether the debate should have gone forward, such that walking off the blogging stage, so to speak, is a form of “gotcha” contrary to the rules governing the debate. [67] I realize that this sounds like a form of defence of mitigation of a defamatory comment. But I see it more as an uncompleted comment, something akin to a plaintiff arguing that he or she has been defamed by a question, when the response was what the audience was expecting. It appears that the Court’s view was a response, in part, to the concern that the threat of legal action may chill debate on the internet: [70] Bringing an action on the comment in mid-debate runs contrary to the rules and has the effect of chilling discussion. If allowed, it places the opposing party in a defensive mode, rather than an offensive one, strategically putting that party at a disadvantage. … [74] The comment of the defendant Smith was on topic and generally consistent with the language and positions taken in the on-going debate. Accordingly, in no sense was it one that would have had any different effect on the plaintiff’s reputation from other derogatory remarks made throughout the blogs. Like those comments, it should have been answered to remove the sting, if any, and to comply with expectations of readers of these blogs. It is interesting to note that the impugned statements were made on an internet message board that was distinct from the blogs on which much of the previous debate had occurred. The Court appears to have considered the comments made in all of these forums as a whole rather than concentrating on isolated comments in determining whether the impugned statements were defamatory: Baglow, at para. 27. However, one might question whether the forums had the same audience, and whether a reasonable reader will anticipate a rejoinder in a place on the internet that differs from the one where the previous debate occurred. In any event, the Court’s comments should not be read to suggest that persons defamed on the internet should necessarily enter the fray and respond to defamatory comments if given the opportunity to do so. The allegedly defamatory statements in this case were made in the context of an acrimonious debate in which the plaintiff was found to have participated. This is distinguishable from circumstances in which a plaintiff finds themselves defamed by statements made on a blog or message board in which they have not participated. In these cases, the context of the comment from the perspective of the reasonable reader will not be one that anticipates a rejoinder. It may be advisable for victims of internet defamation in these circumstances to avoid responding to defamatory comments in order to avoid inviting further attention to the matter and increasing the harm to their reputation. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Quoted on Slaw, the Heenan Blaikie LLP Entertainment and Media Law Signal, and also posted on the International Forum for Responsible Media. Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in blogs and bloggers, Canadian law, internet defamation, technology Tags: 2011 ONSC 5131, Baglow v. Smith 1 Comment » Hiatus until September 2011 September 8, 2010 There will be no updates for the duration of the author’s clerkship with the Supreme Court of British Columbia, due to the requirement of impartiality associated with that role. Readers are thanked and encouraged to visit again in September 2011. Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in uncategorized Leave a Comment » Warman v. Fournier et al: Balancing Disclosure, Privacy, and Freedom of Expression Interests in Internet Defamation Cases May 4, 2010 While the internet provides users with an environment in which socially valuable anonymous speech can flourish, it also provides users with an opportunity to defame others behind a shield of anonymity. If these users can be identified, they may be held liable for defamation. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the identities of these individuals are usually known only by the website or internet service provider (“ISP”) through which the statements were made, and these entities generally decline to disclose a user’s identity in the absence of a court order compelling them to do so. Faced with a growing stream of plaintiffs who seek these kinds of orders, courts have sought to craft approaches to evaluating applications for disclosure that strike an appropriate balance between the privacy interests of anonymous internet posters and the reputational interests of plaintiffs. Yesterday, the Ontario Divisional Court released its decision in Warman v. Fournier et al, 2010 ONSC 2126 (Div. Ct.) rev’g (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4th) 227, 76 C.P.C. (6th) 155 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Warman”). At issue was whether the disclosure provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) automatically entitle plaintiffs in internet defamation cases to obtain the identifying information of anonymous posters from websites and ISPs, or whether courts must balance the interests of plaintiffs with the freedom of expression and privacy interests of anonymous posters. The decision is now the leading authority in Ontario for the proposition that the objectives of the disclosure obligations under the Rules must be balanced with the right of freedom of expression in internet defamation cases. This article discusses the background, holding, and implications of Warman. 1. Background The Respondent commenced an action against the Appellants, the operators of an internet message board, and eight anonymous message board participants with respect to a series of allegedly defamatory postings. After commencing the action, the Respondent brought a motion for an order compelling the Appellants to comply with Rule 76.03 of the Rules which required the Appellants to file an affidavit of documents that disclosed the email and internet protocol (“IP”) addresses of the anonymous posters in order to allow the Respondent to identify the posters and serve them with the statement of claim. The motions judge rejected the Appellants’ submission that the Respondent was required to establish a prima facie case of defamation before disclosure could be ordered. Instead, Justice Kershman concluded that Rule 76.03 of the Rules required the Appellants to disclose all documents in their power or control and that such disclosure should be automatic upon the issuance of a statement of claim because the information was relevant and not protected by privilege. This decision stood in stark contrast with earlier cases that offered some protection to the privacy interests of internet users by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a bona fide or prima facie case of defamation before ordering disclosure (see: previous posting). The motions judge distinguished these cases on the basis that the Respondent was seeking to compel the Appellants to follow the Rules as required by named parties to the action, whereas the other cases involved discretionary orders for the production of documents from third parties. 2. Holding on Appeal The Divisional Court unanimously allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to a different motions judge for re-consideration, recognizing that the anonymous posters’ right of freedom of expression under the Charter should have been taken into account in considering the Respondent’s request for disclosure under the Rules. Moreover, the Court noted that the posters’ express decisions to remain anonymous gave them a reasonable expectation of privacy that weighed in their favour. In rejecting the notion that disclosure should be automatic, the Court also expressed concern for the ease by which a plaintiff could abuse the Rules by filing claims in a spurious manner simply to identify an anonymous poster: If disclosure were automatic, a plaintiff with no legitimate claim could misuse the Rules of Civil Procedure by commencing an unmeritorious action for the sole purpose of revealing the identity of anonymous internet commentators, with a view to stifling such commentators and deterring others from speaking out on controversial issues. For this reason, the commencement of a defamation claim does not trump freedom of expression or the right to privacy. [Warman, at para. 33] After surveying previous decisions, Justice Wilton-Siegel set out four considerations, aimed at preventing abuse of the Rules and respecting the privacy of internet users, that should have been considered by the motions judge in deciding whether to order disclosure under the Rules: whether the unknown alleged wrongdoer could have a reasonable expectation of anonymity in the particular circumstances; whether the Respondent has established a prima facie case against the unknown alleged wrongdoer and is acting in good faith; whether the Respondent has taken reasonable steps to identify the anonymous party and has been unable to do so; and whether the public interests favouring disclosure outweigh the legitimate interests of freedom of expression and right to privacy of the persons sought to be identified if the disclosure is ordered. [Warman, at para. 34] In concluding that plaintiffs should be required to meet a prima facie standard rather than a lower bona fide standard, the Court emphasized the importance of protecting freedom of expression and noted that there was no concern that the higher standard would deprive applicants of a remedy: In para. 34 of BMG [2005 FCA 193], the Federal Court of Appeal expressed the concern that, in that case, imposition of a prima facie case standard would effectively strip an applicant of a remedy because the plaintiff could not know the actual case it wished to assert against the defendants until it knew not only their identities but also the nature of their involvement in the [internet] file-sharing activities. Because the present proceeding is a defamation action, that concern does not arise. Unlike BMG, the respondent knows the details of precisely what was done by each of the unknown alleged wrongdoers. In addition, because this proceeding engages a freedom of expression interest, as well as a privacy interest, a more robust standard is required to address the chilling effect on freedom of expression that will result from disclosure. It is also consistent with the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court that establish the relative weight that must be accorded the interest in freedom of expression. In the circumstances of a website promoting political discussion, the possibility of a defence of fair comment reinforces the need to establish the element of defamation on a prima facie basis in order to have due consideration to the interest in freedom of expression. On the other hand, there is no compelling public interest in allowing someone to libel and destroy the reputation of another, while hiding behind a cloak of anonymity. The requirement to demonstrate a prima facie case of defamation furthers the objective of establishing an appropriate balance between the public interest in favour of disclosure and legitimate interests of privacy and freedom of expression. [Warman, at paras. 41 - 42] 3. Implications Warman represents an important recognition that while internet users’ anonymity ought not to be protected absolutely, the mere commencement of a defamation action should not give rise to an automatic entitlement to information identifying a previously anonymous poster without a consideration of the interests of privacy and freedom of expression. Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty with respect to the degree of protection that courts will afford to anonymous posters in the future. Under Canadian law, plaintiffs have two ways to seek disclosure in internet defamation cases. Apart from identifying anonymous defendants by seeking pre-action discovery or production of relevant information under procedural rules, as occurred in Warman, plaintiffs may also bring independent actions for disclosure of the identity of anonymous defendants by way of an equitable bill of discovery known as a “Norwich order”. Norwich orders were introduced in the decision of the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 (H.L.) in which it was held that where a third party becomes involved in the tortious acts of others, that third party has a duty to disclose the identity of the tortfeasor so that the plaintiff may pursue its remedies. The Norwich factors were recently confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in GEA Group AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corporation, 2009 ONCA 619 and applied in the internet defamation context by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises (2009), 311 D.L.R. (4th) 755 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“York University”): whether the applicant has provided evidence sufficient to raise a valid, bona fide or reasonable claim; whether the applicant has established a relationship with the third-party from whom the information is sought, such that it establishes that the third party is involved in the acts; whether the third party is the only practicable source of the information; whether the third party can be indemnified for costs to which it may be exposed because of the disclosure; and whether the interests of justice favour obtaining the disclosure. [York University, at para. 13] Although the second and fourth Norwich factors were not relevant in Warman because they apply only to third party respondents rather than co-defendants [see Warman, at para. 39], some of the other Norwich factors are similar to the considerations set out in Warman that are now applicable to the question of whether a court should order disclosure under the Rules. However, an important difference remains. While the approach under Warman requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a prima facie case of defamation, Norwich jurisprudence has required plaintiffs to meet the lower bona fide standard. For example, even though the plaintiff in York University managed to establish a prima facie case of defamation, the court did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate more than a bona fide case. Although Warman provides compelling reasons to prefer the higher prima facie standard where the plaintiff seeks disclosure through a Norwich order, it remains open for courts to require plaintiffs to meet the lower standard instead. Subscribe to this blog by email, in a reader, or follow it on Twitter Also posted on Law is Cool and quoted on Slaw, the Wise Law Blog, the Heenan Blaikie LLP Entertainment and Media Law Signal, the International Forum for Responsible Media, and the Blog Law Blog. Posted by Matthew Nied Filed in Canadian law, compelling disclosure of anonymous defendants’ identities, internet anonymity, internet defamation Tags: BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe; 2005 FCA 193; 39 C.P.R. (4th) 97, GEA Group AG v. Flex-N-Gate Corporation; 2009 ONCA 619, Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners; [1974] A.C. 133 (H.L.), Rules of Civil Procedure; R.R.O. 1990; Reg. 194, Warman v. Fournier et al; 2010 ONSC 2126 (Div. Ct.) rev’g (2009); 309 D.L.R. (4th) 227; 76 C.P.C. (6th) 155 (Ont. S.C.J.), York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises (2009); 311 D.L.R. (4th) 755 (Ont. S.C.J.) 3 Comments » Grant v. Torstar and the defence of responsible communication: implications for bloggers and users of other online media"

"

January 25, 2010

In the recent decision of Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 (“Grant”) and its companion case, Quan v. Cusson2009 SCC 62 (“Quan”), the Supreme Court of Canada sought to strike a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation by creating the new defence of “responsible communication on matters of public interest” (the “Defence”).

The Defence allows defendants in libel cases where statements of fact are at issue to evade liability if they can show that they acted responsibly in reporting on a matter of public interest, even if the statements of fact are untrue. Prior to the decision, defendants could not avoid liability in these cases unless they showed that the statement was substantially true (the defence of justification), or that the statement was made in a protected context (the defence of privilege).
Importantly, the Defence applies not only to journalists and print-based publishers – the types of defendants in Grant and Quan – but also to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media:
[T]he traditional media are rapidly being complemented by new ways of communicating on matters of public interest, many of them online, which do not involve journalists. These new disseminators of news and information should, absent good reasons for exclusion, be subject to the same laws as established media outlets. I agree … that the new defence is “available to anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium”. [Grant, at para. 96]
[Emphasis added]
Although the extension of the Defence to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media is an important recognition of the growing relevance and legitimacy of these groups, the Defence is – at least currently – unlikely to protect most members of these groups. To gain the protection of the Defence, the defendant must establish two elements: (1) that the publication is on a matter of public interest; and (2) that the publication was responsible, in that the defendant was diligent in trying to verify the allegation. The trial judge will determine the first element. If the judge concludes that the first element is met, the jury will determine the second element, having regard to several factors:
  • the seriousness of the allegation;
  • the public importance of the matter;
  • the urgency of the matter;
  • the status and reliability of the source;
  • whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately reported;
  • whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable;
  • whether the defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than its truth; and
  • any other relevant circumstances
In assessing whether the defendant was diligent, the jury will be guided by “established journalistic standards”:
[M]any actions now concern blog postings and other online media which are potentially both more ephemeral and more ubiquitous than traditional print media. While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
This indicates that the same journalistic standard must be applied to every defendant irrespective of whether or not they are journalists. As a result, the Defence will likely not apply to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media unless they perform the due diligence expected of a journalist in the circumstances.
The problem for many members of these groups is that they are generally not guided by established journalistic norms. Although they may approach online publishing in good faith and with a level of diligence reasonably expected of non-journalists, this level of diligence is unlikely to meet the required journalistic standard. For example, although journalists will generally make a point of seeking the plaintiff’s side of the story and speaking directly to witnesses and experts, non-journalist bloggers – who are generally unpaid for their efforts – will rarely have the time, resources, training, or willingness to do so. As one American commentator argues,
blogging and journalism clearly differ. The former ‘implies that adisinterested third party is reporting facts fairly’ (Andrews, 2003: 64). Blogs are ‘unedited, unabashedly opinionated, sporadic and personal’ (Palser, 2002) – in many ways, the antithesis of traditional US journalism. Some say that is the best thing about them. ‘Journalism is done a certain way, by a certain kind of people,’ but bloggers “are oblivious to such traditions” (Welsh, 2003). [Jane B. Singer, “The political j-blogger: ‘normalizing’ a new media form to fit old norms” (2005) 6(2) Journalism 173 at 176]
[Emphasis added]
Even if a non-journalist blogger or user of other online media does engage in the level of diligence required to meet the journalistic standard, they may unknowingly fail to do so in a way that produces a strong record of evidence from which a court can conclude that they did act diligently. As a result, many of these defendants may simply not have access to the protection of the Defence.
Nonetheless, Grant does not foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media as the “norms of new communications media” evolve. Although the court isn’t clear on this point, these groups might be able to gain the protection of the Defence in future cases even if they haven’t performed their diligence in the same way that a traditional journalist would have:
While established journalistic standards provide a useful guide by which to evaluate the conduct of journalists and non-journalists alike, the applicable standards will necessarily evolve to keep pace with the norms of new communications media. [Grant, at para. 97]
[Emphasis added]
Even if the standard applicable to these groups does not shift to allow them to gain the protection of the Defence, juries – who have been tasked with the responsibility for assessing whether the defendant was diligent – may be sympathetic to these groups and apply the journalistic standard less rigidly.
In summary, although the Defence extends to non-journalist bloggers and users of other online media, many members of these groups are unlikely to be protected by the Defence because it requires that they performed the due diligence expected of a journalist. Nonetheless, the law does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that courts will apply a different diligence standard to these groups in future cases, or that juries will less rigidly apply the existing journalistic standard."

Source of Post
http://matthewnied.com/page/3/

"Crookes v. Newton: Hyperlinking, Defamation Law, and Freedom of Expression on the Internet"

"Last week, the Supreme Court of Canada released its landmark decision in Crookes v. Newton, 2011 SCC 47, affirming 2009 BCCA 392 and 2008 BCSC 1424. At issue was whether creating an internet hyperlink to defamatory material constitutes “publication” of the material for the purposes of defamation law. The case challenged the Court to strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation in the new context of internet communications.

To succeed in a defamation action, a plaintiff must first prove that defamatory words were published. The decision in Crookes stands for the proposition that a hyperlink, by itself, is not publication of the content to which it refers. Publication will only occur if the hyperlink is presented in a way that repeats the defamatory content. This article discusses the decision’s background, reasoning, and implications.

Background

The appellant brought numerous defamation actions against various individuals and organizations alleging that he had been defamed in several articles on the internet. After those actions were commenced, the respondent posted an article on his website which commented on the implications of the plaintiff’s defamation suits for operators of internet forums. The respondent’s article included hyperlinks to websites containing some of the allegedly defamatory articles that were the subject of the plaintiff’s actions. However, the respondent’s article did not reproduce or comment on the content in those articles.

The appellant discovered the respondent’s article and advised him to remove the hyperlinks. When the respondent refused, the appellant brought an action seeking damages for defamation on the basis that the hyperlinks constituted publication of the allegedly defamatory articles. There was evidence that the respondent’s article had been viewed 1,788 times, but no evidence as to how many times, if any, the hyperlinks in the article had been followed."

Source of Post
http://matthewnied.com/2011/10/24/crookes-v-newton-hyperlinking-defamation-law-and-freedom-of-expression-on-the-internet/

Protected Free-Speech Opinions

"A California appellate court has affirmed a lower court’s ruling granting a woman’s anti-SLAPP motion against her daughter’s ex-husband regarding online postings the woman made about him.

The genesis of Darren Chaker’s lawsuit against Nicole Mateo and her mother, Wendy, was apparently a contentious custody battle in Texas courts regarding the former couple’s child. This battle appears to have helped prompt Wendy Mateo’s online comments, which in turn led to Chaker’s defamation suit.

In granting Wendy Mateo’s anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”) motion to strike the defamation suit, the appellate court affirmed that she was merely exercising her First Amendment right to free speech in the matter.

Principally at issue in the case of Chaker v. Mateo, No. D058753, 2012 WL4711885 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2012) were the online postings of Wendy Mateo regarding ex-son-in-law Chaker’s business practices and moral character. Examples:"

Click for Source and Full Post
http://bloglawblog.com/blog/?p=4287

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Investigative Blogger Crystal L. Cox Files an Amended Counterclaim in District of Nevada Civil Case 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL, a Chilling Effect, Chill Speech, First Amendment Threat, Free Speech Threat, SLAPP Lawsuit Filed out of Las Vegas Nevada, against Pro Se Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox, Anti-Corruption Blogger.

State of Nevada Chilling Effect Lawsuit against Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox.

District of Nevada Lawsuit Free Speech Threat, First Amendment Threat, Constitutional Rights Lawsuit, Fraud on Courts, Attorney Privilege, Malpractice, RICO Claims, Defamation Claims, and Lot's More.

Below is the Amended Counter Claim Filed by Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox



For More on Nevada Chilling Effect Case, SLAPP Lawsuit, Free Speech Threat, First Amendment Threat, Constitutional Rights Filing Legal Case Documents, Click Below

Document List / Docket Filings




Saturday, January 26, 2013

"CHUCK O’NEAL’S MINISTERIAL LICENSE REVOKED"


"Apprising Ministries first brought the sad saga of Chuck O’Neal to your attention in Beaverton Grace Bible Church To Sue Ex-Member For Negative Blog Review?

It begins with this news report (video below) from Anita Kissée of KATU News of Portland, OR. May 12, 2012 Kissée and the KATU staff informed us:
A church pastor is suing a mother and daughter for $500,000 because they gave the church bad reviews online. The family being sued left the church a few years ago and Julie Anne Smith says she and her family were shunned and couldn’t understand why.
So she went online and wrote Google and DEX reviews of the church and then started a blog. ”I thought, I’m just going to post a review,” Smith said. “We do it with restaurants and hotels and whatnot, and I thought, why not do it with this church?”
Never did she think Beaverton Grace Bible Church and Pastor Charles O’Neal would slap her with the lawsuit. (source)"

Fully Article and Source
 http://apprising.org/2012/12/28/chuck-oneals-ministerial-license-revoked/

The Crystal Cox Case Forces the Ninth Circuit to Firmly Establish "Who qualifies as a Member of the News Media"? Who has Reporter Privilege and what Qualifies One as a "Reporter", a "Journalist"? Who, among us Reporting the NEWS is protected by the First Amendment? Are ALL Citizens protected by the First Amendment or Just Traditional Media, Big Media? The Crystal Cox Ninth Circuit Appeal Examines, Thoroughly, once and for all, in modern day Online Media, WHO is A "Journalist"? Who is Protected by the Courts to Report the "News"?

<font size='2'><a href='http://www.docstoc.com/docs/133593941/Obsidian V. Cox Appeal; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press'>Obsidian V. Cox Appeal; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press</a></font><br/><object id='_ds_133593941' name='_ds_133593941' width='630' height='550' type='application/x-shockwave-flash' data='http://viewer.docstoc.com/'><param name='FlashVars' value='doc_id=133593941&mem_id=undefined&doc_type=pdf&fullscreen=0&allowdownload=1&showrelated=0&showotherdocs=0' /><param name='movie' value='http://viewer.docstoc.com/'/><param name='allowScriptAccess' value='always' /><param name='allowFullScreen' value='true' /></object><br /><script type='text/javascript'>var docstoc_docid='133593941'; var docstoc_title='Obsidian V. Cox Appeal; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press'; var docstoc_urltitle='Obsidian V. Cox Appeal; the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press';</script><script type='text/javascript' src='http://i.docstoccdn.com/js/check-flash.js'></script>

Friday, January 25, 2013

It is a Crime to Willfully Deprive Pro Se Defendant / Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox and Defendant Eliot Bernstein of their rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.


"
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law

This statute makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.

This law further prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different punishments, pains, or penalties, than those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such person being an alien or by reason of his/her color or race.

Acts under "color of any law" include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under "color of any law," the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. This definition includes, in addition to law enforcement officials, individuals such as Mayors, Council persons, Judges, Nursing Home Proprietors, Security Guards, etc., persons who are bound by laws, statutes ordinances, or customs.

Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined. "

Source
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/federal-statutes

Chill Speech Lawsuit, Free Speech Threat, First Amendment Legal Threat; State of Nevada Case 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL Docket Entries, Motions, Replies, Objections, Responses. As of January 23 2013.


Pro Se Defendant / Pro Say Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox Requests Judge Sign a Conflict of Interest Disclosure Admitting or Denying Conflict



************

Original Complaint







Counterclaim




Plaintiff Motion to Strike Counterclaim and Complaint Answer


Objection / Response in Opposition to to PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT CRYSTAL COX’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND ANSWER.



Plaintiff Files for Preliminary Injunction and WINS


EX PARTE MOTION / Proposed Order for Temporary Restraining Order and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Filed by Plaintiffs, District of Nevada Case Number 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL, Document Number 2
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142406400/Ex-Parte-Motion-for-Temporary-Restraining-Order-and-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction


Document 2-1 Marc J. Randazza Declaration in support of Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142406320/Document-2-1-Marc-J-Randazza-Declaration-in-support-of-Ex-Parte-Motion-for-Temporary-Restraining-Order-and-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction


SUPPLEMENT TO EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, Document #6.
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142405386/SUPPLEMENT-TO-EX-PARTE-MOTION



Pro Se Defendant / Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox Response / Objectionto to EX PARTE MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Filed by Plaintiffs, Document 29
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142332681/Defendant-Crystal-Cox-Objection-to-TRO-Injunctive-Relief



Memorandum To Pro Se Defendant / Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox Response / Objection to to EX PARTE MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142332992/Memorandum-to-Objection-to-Injunctive-Relief-and-Temporary-TRO-in-Favor-of-Plaintiff



REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, Document 12
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142405610/REPLY-IN-SUPPORT-OF-PLAINTIFFS%E2%80%99-MOTION-FOR-TEMPORARY-RESTRAINING-ORDER-AND-MOTION-PRELIMINARY-INJUNCTION



ORDER Granting 2 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Motion Hearing set for 1/7/2013 03:00 PM in LV Courtroom 7D before Judge Gloria M. Navarro re 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Responses due by 12/28/2012. Replies due by 1/4/2013. Signed by Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 12/14/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR) (Entered:12/17/2012), Document Entry 14
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142332117/Exhibit-TRO-A-Letter-From-Ron-Green-Ltr-to-Cox-encl-TRO-Order


REPLY to Response to 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiffs / REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Cox and Bernstein, Document 28
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142405052/REPLY-IN-SUPPORT-OF-PLAINTIFFS-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-Against-Cox-and-Bernstein



REPLY to Response to MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and
MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Crystal L Cox Document 30
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/142333607/Opposition-to-Document-28---Google-Drive




District of Nevada Case Number 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL Court Docket Entry 35

Judge Refuses to Sign Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Admit or Deny Conflict, Judge
DENIES Motion to Sign COI Disclsure.

Judge Denies to Recluse, Remove, Disqualify Herself as Judge in District of Nevada Case Number 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL as Requested in a Motion filed by Pro Se Defendant / Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox.

" MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS - Motion Hearing held on 1/7/2013 before
Judge Gloria M. Navarro. Crtrm Administrator: Michael Zadina; Pla Counsel:
Ronald Green; Def Counsel: None present; Court Reporter/FTR #: Araceli
Bareng; Time of Hearing: 3:49-4:09 a.m.; Courtroom: 7D;

The Court makes preliminary remarks and hears representations from Mr.
Green regarding the 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

IT IS ORDERED that 19 Motion forJudges and Clerks to Sign a Conflict of Interest Disclosure is DENIED;

20 Motion Requesting the Recusal, Removal of District Judge is DENIED;

31 Motion to Strike Defendant Cox's Reply to Response is DENIED; and

Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. Mr. Green
shall file a proposed order consistent with the Court's ruling."


                               ************


Pro Se Defendant / Pro Say Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox Files Motion Requesting to Remove Judge in State of Nevada Case 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL


First Request by Pro Se Defendant / Pro Say Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox to Remove Judge from State of Nevada Case 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL.


Judge Denies to Recluse, Remove, Disqualify Herself as Judge in District of Nevada Case Number 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL as Requested in a Motion filed by Pro Se Defendant / Pro Se Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox.


" MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS - Motion Hearing held on 1/7/2013 before
Judge Gloria M. Navarro. Crtrm Administrator: Michael Zadina; Pla Counsel:
Ronald Green; Def Counsel: None present; Court Reporter/FTR #: Araceli
Bareng; Time of Hearing: 3:49-4:09 a.m.; Courtroom: 7D;



The Court makes preliminary remarks and hears representations from Mr.
Green regarding the 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

IT IS ORDERED that 19 Motion forJudges and Clerks to Sign a Conflict of Interest Disclosure is DENIED;



20 Motion Requesting the Recusal, Removal of District Judge is DENIED;



31 Motion to Strike Defendant Cox's Reply to Response is DENIED; and



Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. Mr. Green
shall file a proposed order consistent with the Court's ruling."


Motion to Reconsider Request by Pro Se Defendant / Pro Say Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox to Remove Judge Gloria M. Navarro (Second Request)






                                 
                               ************

Defendant Crystal Cox Motion for Protective Order





                               ************





Thursday, January 24, 2013

Stirring Media LLC Giving Bad Information and Bad Advice on the Very Important Bloggers Rights, Free Speech Rights, First Amendment Rights Case of Obsidian Finance Group V. Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox Case


Just How Ignorant is STIRRING MEDIA LLC? 

Apparently I, Blogger Crystal Cox, was a BIG disappointment 

to bloggers and journalists, EVERYWHERE.  Gee Darn,
and I So Sought their Approval for my INDEPENDENT PRODUCT.


First of all Bloggers, a lot of them are Journalists. Which is what I am fighting for.

My Precedence will make it LEGAL for you to post things like this post about me, Blogger Crystal Cox, which is riddled with weak words for weak, scared, sheeple bloggers.  And consumed with BAD Information, Mis-FACTS, and Flat Out LIES.

I did not DEFAME anyone. I reported on a $40 Million Dollar Bankruptcy and a Trustee that ran aMok. Read the Documents, read the Facts.

Oh and if the "disappointment" to those bloggers and journalists you refer to is regarding my Alleged Extortion, First, Engage your BRAIN and NOTE, even if I am a Criminal I can still be a Journalist, a Reporter and well, a Citizen, that has First Amendment Rights, and should be protected under those same PRIVILEGED Laws as BIG MEDIA, and Traditional Journalists.

Secondly, Crystal Cox was NOT on trial for Extortion, if that is what your alleging is so darn disappointing to bloggers and journalists. Oh and I use RADICAL, Strong, Internet Marketing to Get Victims of Corruption in the U.S. Courts Found.  Those disappointed bloggers and journalists, don't have the BALLS to do this as they answer to the SYSTEM, to Corporate Greed, and Politics. I am TRULY, actually, REALLY Independent Reporting. 

STIRRING MEDIA LLC Gives you Bloggers, Citizen Journalists, Whistle Blowers Exposing Corruption BAD, BAD Advice

If you want to actually learn the case, READ ALL the Documents. If you want to Understand the role of Obsidian Finance Group in the Summit Bankruptcy then study those documents. OR you can be a spineless, balless follower of those disappoint bloggers and journalists and be ALL butthurt and disappointed in Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox who really don't give a shit.

Dipshit Media, STIRRING MEDIA Says, "The Crystal L. Cox case shook the blogosphere, ultimately disappointing bloggers and journalists everywhere with the truth regarding her tactics and how she used blogging and search engine optimization. What happened, and what could this case mean to you, especially if you don’t consider yourself an “investigative blogger” or even blog as your profession? "

WOW I was disappointing to bloggers and journalists EVERYWHERE, WOW, little ol' ME? Geez guess they don't know how to read and simply have the OPINION they are Told to Have by that thar REAL MEDIA.

oh and Stirring Media, says, "with the truth regarding her tactics",

WOW, the TRUTH, Stirring Media is that really what your going with? And where did you get your TRUTH? From those involved in the corruption I was and am exposing or from the BIG MEDIA that my Case Precedence is BRINGING Down by Ending the MONOPOLY that Big Media has on FREE SPEECH.  Can Ya Read, DUDE ?

Do you get how Important my Case is to ALL Citizen Journalists, Investigative Blogger and Whistleblowers?  Wake the FUCK up !!

oh and Stirring Media, says,  "The original trial took  place in December 2011, when the court ruled that Cox has to pay Obsidian Financial and bankruptcy lawyer Kevin Padrick $2.5 million for defamation.

Cox claimed in her numerous blog posts and websites that Padrick and company had engaged in tax fraud, bribery, and money laundering, among other things.

The blogging community was originally outraged, as the opinion was interpreted to mean that as a blogger, Cox was not a journalist and therefore wasn’t protected by the state’s shield law. On the surface, it seemed like a company with more money and power was able to squash the notion that it could be involved in wrong doing.

Reports from April 2012 now reveal that Cox wasn’t the victim of an outdated shield law, but was a scammer who utilized blogging and the Internet to ruin people’s online reputations, only to offer reputation management services to the very people she defamed. It was found that this was the case with Padrick and Obsidian Financial, as well as the journalists who covered the case in the months after, their family members, government officials in her home town, and other individuals at high-profile companies. Cox has never proven her accusationsHer case went to appeal, which was denied, where the original judge clarified by saying that he did not say all bloggers weren’t journalists, just not Cox."

WRONG again Dumb Ass, Trial was in November for One. And Bankruptcy TRUSTEE, Court Appointed, WAY Different than Bankruptcy Lawyer.

And yes I "Claimed" all that, I alleged and I linked to and gave the court massive internal documents, legal filings, videos, deposition and more from 3 years of sources. I have been reporting on this case for 3 Years.

"On the surface, it seemed like a company with more money and power was able to squash the notion that it could be involved in wrong doing."

YEP and that is Exactly what Happened, have you followed this at all, have you read the documents or their latest MOVE to Steal my Appeal Right. Have you "Investigated" to see if they were GUILTY?  Have you "Investigated" to see if there was really EXTORTION or if that was ANY part of the Case?

Ya Exposing People's CORRUPT Actions does RUIN their Reputation. 

I did not ruin their reputation, I Turned a BIG Fat Light on in the Dark, Dirty Corrupt Room ALL the Bad Reputation Causing Behavior was happening.

 I did not create it, nor make it up, nor post it to extort anyone. I offered a deal in a Settlement Negotiation AFTER I was sued. The email in Forbes and the New York Times is ONE of 5 and its part of 1 of 9 Settlement Negotiations. It was NOT Extortion, wake Up. I never Extorted anyone, I never received MONEY.

I was not on Trial for Extortion, I was not investigated for Extortion, I did not have a Criminal Complaint Filed for Extortion, I was not prosecuted for Extortion.

CAN YOU READ or JUST REGURGITATE ???

Now That you have Called me a SCAMMER, which I am NOT, you will now be named a Legal Action in Criminal and Civil Conspiracy, as I have SCAMMED no One.

Stirring Media, says, "Cox has never proven her accusations", are you kidding ?

You sure are STUPID, have you read my site or just listened to OTHERS, Hear Say?

I gave the court over 400 documents, I had source(S), I had videos, internal emails, documents, depositions, legal filings, audio hearings, transcripts and more and I have had them on my sites and they are on the source site for over 3 years.

OH and the DUMBEST THING THAT Stirring Media LLC SAID "Her case went to appeal, which was denied",   Keep in mind Reader that this was Published January 16, 2013 at 3:49 pm. And if Stirring Media LLC had any FACTS they would know that at that time, on that VERY day, a Sheriff's Sale was Scheduled, for WHAT? my Assets, what Asset? my Right to APPEAL, very important story to report on, Stirring Media missed that one.

Oh and if  Stirring Media LLC had any FACTS they would know that my APPEAL has been going on for a year, and TONS of surrounding information and issues important to ALL those Disappointed Bloggers and Journalists. Yet  Stirring Media LLC says my Appeal was Denied??? What??

Talk about BAD MEDIA !!

Oh ya and Judge Marco Hernandez did Say that ONLY Crystal Cox is not "Media", not a JOURNALIST, but hey YOU Could Be...  you got ONE RIGHT, So Stirring Media LLC does that sound RIGHT TO YOU?

Make any Sense at ALL? Why ME?

Because I have no standards? Really, so if the Judge don't like my style the laws or constitution does not apply to me? Or if the Judge thinks I am a Criminal then I am not protected by the law or constitutional rights in journalism, in a CIVIL TRIAL?

Oh and if the JUDGE thinks I am Criminal, why not file a Criminal Complaint, I mean Come ON, he is a Federal Judge RIGHT?

Wake UP.  Do you NOT Get CORRUPTION Jack Ass.  oh and Even if I am Guilty of Extortion that has nothing to do with whether the First Amendment, Retraction Laws, Shield Laws applied to me on that ONE Blog Post?  HELLO !!

Stirring Media, says, "The first thing to do, if you’re a blogger who wants to be a journalist, is to understand what it means to be a journalist and what behaviors are associated with good journalists. United States District Court Judge Marco A. Hernandez defined media toward the end of his opinion of the original trial, which states:"  WRONG again, I certainly did all those things, wake Up.  Behavior has NOTHING to do with whether you are protected under the First Amendment, WAKE UP.

You Don't Think I met any of those "media" definitions, REALLY?

7 years at this, 1200 Blogs, massive content, interviews, emails, sources, notes, editing capabilities and you think I met NONE of those. Or maybe I met them, but gee Darn I am a Criminal GUILTY of Extortion, Said no AUTHORITY, and so therefore I don't qualify on those reasons, this judge, says qualifies one as MEDIA.


Stirring Media, says, "Follow this definition, and you and your work won’t be discredited as sensational or opinionated."

WOW, well geez that's what we hard hitting, corruption exposing Investigative Bloggers, Whistle Blower, Citizen Journalist go for, to NOT Sensationalize or be Opinionated. Wouldn't want the sheeple to discredit the TRUTH and believe the LIE, now would we?

Stirring Media, says, "Second Lesson.  The second lesson is that bloggers can no longer get away with saying whatever they want, whenever they want online. Prior to this, bloggers have gotten away with writing falsehoods, releasing juicy stories before all the facts are in, or spreading rumor for self gain. If it can count as defamation, then it can be subject to an investigation and a trial similar to Cox’s. Even if it’s meant to be opinion, it’s important to exercise restraintTake the time to do the legwork, to find evidence that’s more than anecdotal or circumstantial."

BULLSHIT, Bloggers certainly Do have the RIGHT to Say whatever the FUCK they Want, whenever the FUCK THEY Want to. And if you are reporting on a Case and giving links to thousands of documents of proof, well BOY HOWDY, I suppose your entitled to an opinion or two, as well. And well if you have a BRAIN and the FACTS are Blatant, Obvious and Handy, well then you will certainly be BIASED to one side or the OTHER. That is what REAL Facts do. THEY expose the Truth and in that, how can the BLOGGER not be BIASED, DUH?

So Investigative Bloggers, Whistle Blower, Citizen Journalist Release THOSE Juicy Stories and Fear Not, it is on your Knowledge and Belief. Post them facts, post documents and videos and FEAR NOT, and do not listen to the scaredy cat advice of Sensational Stirring Media.

oH and I have had NO Self GAIN. I have gave Everything I knew to be my life for this fight for victims of corruption and for the rights of  Investigative Bloggers, Whistle Blower, and Citizen Journalist to Expose Corrupt Judges, Attorneys, Bankruptcy Trustees, Corporations, Politicians and more.

oh But if your going for mamby pampy regurgitating blogging like Stirring Media seems to strive for well then keep it MIDDLE of the Road, without Opinion, without Bias, oh and no Sensationalism to Discredit those words.

So Folks in the words of WISE Sage Stirring Media LLC, "Take the time to do the legwork, to find evidence"  UNLIKE Stirring Media LLC has the capability, brains or balls to do.

Link to Mamby Bamby, Middle of the Road, Clueless, Factless Blog Post by STIRRING MEDIA, LLC Quoted Above
http://www.stirringmediallc.com/crystal-l-cox-case-bloggers/


For More REAL Research

http://www.crystalcoxcase.com/

http://www.obsidianfinancesucks.com/

http://www.objectiontofees.com/